Loyola University Chicago

Loyola eCommons
School of Business: Faculty Publications and
Other Works

Faculty Publications and Other Works by
Department

2-2020

Credibility of Crime Allegations
Frances Xu Lee
Loyola University Chicago, flee3@luc.edu

Wing Suen

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/business_facpubs
Part of the Business Commons, and the Economics Commons

Recommended Citation
Xu Lee, Frances and Suen, Wing. Credibility of Crime Allegations. American Economic Journal:
Microeconomics, 12, 1: 220-259, 2020. Retrieved from Loyola eCommons, School of Business: Faculty
Publications and Other Works, http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20180231

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications and Other Works by Department
at Loyola eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in School of Business: Faculty Publications and Other
Works by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please contact
ecommons@luc.edu.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.
© American Economic Association, 2020.

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 2020, 12(1): 220–259
https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20180231

Credibility of Crime Allegations†
By Frances Xu Lee and Wing Suen*
The lack of hard evidence in allegations about sexual misconduct
makes it difficult to separate true allegations from false ones. We provide a model in which victims and potential libelers face the same
costs and benefits from making an allegation, but the tendency for
perpetrators of sexual misconduct to engage in repeat offenses allows
semiseparation to occur, which lends credibility to such allegations.
Our model also explains why reports about sexual misconduct are
often delayed, and why the public rationally assigns less credibility
to these delayed reports. (JEL D82, J16, K14, K42)

R

ecent scandals of sexual crimes and misconduct have gripped the headlines
and spawned a nascent movement to raise consciousness about a serious problem that used to be underreported.

The stories of Bill Cosby, Larry Nassar, Harvey
Weinstein, and many others share some striking similarities. First, the conduct
involved mostly was not violent in nature, so that c lear-cut hard evidence is lacking.1 Second, the same person repeatedly offended multiple victims. Third, no arrest
or prosecution was made upon the first allegation against the offender. Fourth, many
allegations were made years after the alleged incidents.
The Bill Cosby trial stemmed from an allegation made by Andrea Constand in
2005 alleging that Bill Cosby, a comedian, drugged and raped her in 2004. This
was the first public rape allegation against Cosby. No charge was brought against
him at the time. Within the same year, three additional similar allegations against
Cosby arose. Still, no arrest was made. A new wave of allegations surfaced in 2014
and 2015, with over 50 women alleging sexual crimes that happened from 1965 to
2008. Cosby was arrested and charged in 2015 and was convicted of three counts of
aggravated indecent assault in 2018.2

* Lee: Loyola University Chicago, 16 E Pearson St., Chicago, IL 60611 (email: francesxu312@gmail.com);
Suen: The University of Hong Kong, Pok Fu Lam, Hong Kong (email: wsuen@econ.hku.edu). Michael Ostrovsky
was coeditor for this article. We are thankful for suggestions from Mariagiovanna Baccara, Navin Kartik, Harry
Di Pei, Kathy Spier, Bruno Strulovic, and Abraham Wickelgren. We also have benefited from comments by workshop participants at University of Texas at Austin and Nanyang Technological University and by the audience at
American Law and Economics Association Annual Meeting, Public Economic Theory Conference, Econometric
Society Asian Meeting, Midwest Theory Conference, and AEA Annual Meeting.
†
Go to https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20180231 to visit the article page for additional materials and author
disclosure statement(s) or to comment in the online discussion forum.
1
According to End Violence Against Women’s research, “most sexual assaults are committed by someone who
is known to the victim, who does not use a weapon or severe physical violence, and who does not inflict visible
injuries on the victim.” See http://www.evawintl.org/Library/DocumentLibraryHandler.ashx?id=42.
2
Details of this case were widely reported in newspapers. We obtained our sources mostly from the Wikipedia
article “Bill Cosby Sexual Assault Allegations.”
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The Jerry Sandusky sexual abuse case is another notable example. Over a hundred incidents of abuse of children were alleged over time against the former football coach, but the first report in 2008 was met with disbelief. The state attorney
general told the accuser in 2008 that the authorities needed more victims to charge
Sandusky—that is, to overcome the grand jury’s doubt of a possibly false accusation. Sandusky was not arrested until the second report came from a witness in 2010,
reporting an incident that happened more than ten years before.3
An estimated 64 to 96 percent of sexual crime victims do not report the crimes
committed against them (Fisher et al. 2000, Perkins and Klaus 1996). A major reason for this reluctance to report is that victims think their reports will be met with
suspicion or outright disbelief (Jordan 2004). When the crimes do not produce hard
evidence, there is a classic asymmetric information problem: a true victim cannot easily separate himself or herself from a libeler who makes a false accusation.
A libeler can be motivated by a grudge, political motives, publicity, or potential
financial gains. In 2006, three Duke athletes were accused of sexual assault, which
was later found baseless. In 2014, Rolling Stone published an article, “A Rape on
Campus,” accusing several University of Virginia students of gang rape. The magazine had to retract the article in its entirety because the rape allegation was discredited. But not all false reporting is eventually rebuked. For allegations that do not
present enough winning probability for the prosecutor to bring charges, there is no
judgment from the jury whether or not they are true. No wonder so-called estimates
of the percentage of false accusations among all reports range widely from 1.5 to
90 percent in the empirical literature (Lonsway, Archambault, and Lisak 2009).
While the percentage of false accusations is unclear, the potential of a report being
false has to be the reason why sexual crime reports are not assigned a perfect credibility. Absent the possible existence of false accusers, the authorities would simply
bring all cases to court, and the jury would always be able to convict beyond doubt.
This is clearly not the reality. Tom Tremblay, an investigator in the sex crimes unit
in Burlington, Vermont, said, “unlike any other crime I responded to in my career,
there was always this thought that a rape report was a false report.”4 Understanding
the circumstances that lend credibility to sexual crime allegations is important in the
fight against these crimes.
This article studies the incentives to allege a crime by victims or by potential
libelers in a two-period setup. There may be multiple potential accusers who can
make public but unverifiable reports against the same person. These accusers can
choose whether or not to report, as well as when to report. We aim to address three
major questions regarding these allegations. First, allegations of sexual crimes
are often made of incidents that happened a long time ago, which we call delayed
reports. These delayed reports can come from victims who are delaying to report a
true crime, as demonstrated by the Sandusky case, or from libelers who are choosing
3
Joseph Rhee, Gerry Wagschal, and Linh Tran, “Sandusky Victim 1 Steps Out of Shadows, Says Justice Took Too
Long,” ABC News, October 19, 2012, https://abcnews.go.com/US/sandusky-victim-reveals-identity-justice-long/
story?id=17511612.
4
Rebecca Ruiz, “Why Don’t Cops Believe Rape Victims? Brain Science Helps Explain the Problem—and
Solve It,” Slate, June 19, 2013, https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2013/06/why-cops-dont-believe-rape-victimsand-how-brain-science-can-solve-the-problem.html.
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to make false accusations long after the time of interaction with the accused. Why do
delayed reports appear so often? Second, given the possibility of false accusations,
how much credence should be given to allegations that are unsubstantiated by witnesses or physical evidence? Third, a delayed report is typically met with suspicion.
For example, in October 2016, supporters of Donald Trump had started the hashtag
#NextFakeTrumpVictim by attacking the sexual assault allegations against Trump
with tweets that read, for example, “Why didn’t these ‘victims’ come forward 30
years ago? Could’ve scored a hefty sum from a billionaire.” Is such skepticism
justified?
A key to our analysis is that sexual crimes are often committed by recidivists, who
have a tendency to engage in repeat offenses against other victims. According to the
Rape, Abuse, and Incest National Network (RAINN), more than half of all alleged
rapists have at least one prior conviction. Taking into account the low reporting rate
and the low conviction rate,5 this statistic suggests a strong tendency for rapists to
engage in repeat offenses. In addition, the medical literature suggests that “pedophilia is a sexual orientation and unlikely to change.”6 In this paper, we assume that
a true victim expects a higher chance that another victim exists who may provide
corroboration than a potential libeler does.
The possibility of the existence of another victim or another potential libeler produces a freeriding problem. Because a single accusation is often insufficient evidence to cause the authorities to take action, individuals have an incentive to take
a wait-and-see approach and delay making an allegation until another allegation
arises. In our basic model, an individual with relatively low reporting cost always
reports immediately, whereas an individual with higher reporting cost makes a
delayed report if and only if there is another report against the accused.7
On the surface, given that there is a higher chance of having a corroborator for
a victim than for a libeler, one might suspect that a victim is more inclined to wait
for others to report first in order to delay the cost of making an allegation. We argue
that this reasoning is not correct, because it assumes that the potential corroborator’s reporting behavior is not affected by the history he or she observes. In fact, the
potential corroborator (past or future victim) is more likely to report if there has
been a previous report, so the higher incentive to “break the silence” and encourage
the potential corroborator to report dominates the motive to delay reporting costs
for individuals with low reporting costs. This dynamic encouragement effect works
in the opposite direction of the standard freeriding effect in public goods provision.
Because guilty agents have a higher tendency of recidivism than do innocent ones,
the encouragement effect figures more prominently for true victims than for potential libelers. This effect causes true victims to be less inclined to make a delayed
report than are potential libelers. The fact that true victims tend to make timely
crime allegations with a higher probability in turn lends credence to such allegations, allowing a semiseparating equilibrium to exist even when true victims and
5
RAINN estimates that only 310 out of 1,000 rape cases are reported, out of which 11 will get referred to prosecutors and 7 will result in a felony conviction.
6
Harvard Medical School, “Pessimism about Pedophilia,” Harvard Mental Health Letter, July 2010, https://
www.health.harvard.edu/newsletter_article/pessimism-about-pedophilia.
7
This potential f reeriding incentive is called a “first mover disadvantage” in Ayres and Unkovic (2012).
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potential libelers face the same costs and benefits from making an allegation. In
other words, even though allegations are unsubstantiated by hard evidence, they do
contain information that may prompt the authorities into taking action.8
Our model also justifies the public’s skepticism toward delayed reports. If there
is another allegation against a person, victims or libelers who took a w
 ait-and-see
approach will no longer shy from making an allegation because corroborated reports
are more convincing than a single report. But because libelers have a greater probability of taking a wait-and-see approach than victims do, the public rationally assigns
less credibility to delayed reports than to undelayed ones. The public is rightly skeptical because delayed reports are more likely to have been made “opportunistically.”
The communication game described in this article is different from a cheap
talk game (Crawford and Sobel 1982). Here the action of reporting carries a cost,
whereas the action of not reporting does not. Reporting is directly costly for many
reasons. Reporters often have to reveal facts about themselves that are not positive,
such as the use of drugs and alcohol, which can lead to social stigma, suspension
from school, or loss of scholarships.9 Reporters face possible retaliation from the
accused. Investigations are emotionally and physically exhausting. The easier thing
to do is stay silent.
In order to highlight the difficulties in separating truthful allegations from fake
ones, we purposefully avoid the traditional channel of signaling arising from payoff
differences. Both a true victim and a potential libeler in our model have the same
costs of reporting and the same payoffs from the authorities’ decisions.10 In this
sense, our model is different from a standard signaling game (Spence 1973). In our
model, different types (victim or libeler) would behave in exactly the same way if
they are sure that another victim or libeler does not exist. It is the assumption that
victims and libelers expect different probabilities that another accuser may exist that
causes their equilibrium strategies to be different.
Farrell and Saloner (1985) studies the adoption of technology standards or political positions with network benefits, where a player benefits from waiting to see
what the other player chooses as the standard or the position. Ostrovsky and Schwarz
(2005) considers synchronization of timing in this framework, in which early arrival
and late adoption are both costly. In that setup, players simultaneously choose an
adoption time with some stochastic error; there is no encouragement effect because
the move of one player is not observable by other players. Daughety and Reinganum
(2011) studies a dynamic model of victims choosing when to file a lawsuit against
a common defendant, where a plaintiff is more likely to win if more victims sue. In
our paper, given the beliefs of the decision maker in a corroboration equilibrium,
the two victims play a game that is similar to those in Farrell and Saloner (1985)
8
This information comes from equilibrium inference, which may not constitute evidence that is admissible in
court. However, it may be sufficient to induce the authorities to conduct further investigations that lead to arrest or
prosecution.
9
An accuser of rape at Brigham Young University was suspended because of the revelation that she used illegal
drugs. (Jack Healy, “At Brigham Young, A Cost in Reporting a Rape,” New York Times, April 26, 2016, https://www.
nytimes.com/2016/04/27/us/rape-victims-brigham-young-university-honor-code-suspensions.html).
10
In Chandrasekhar, Golub, and Yang (2018), different types have the same costs and benefits from taking
a signaling action (asking for help), and partial separation is achieved in equilibrium because the distribution of
benefits is different for different types.
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and Daughety and Reinganum (2011): relative to the status quo, an action brings a
benefit if coordination succeeds and a cost otherwise. In Farrell and Saloner (1985),
there is no uncertainty about the existence of the other player. Closer to our paper,
the plaintiffs in Daughety and Reinganum (2011) also have the trade-off between
taking a costly action to encourage others and waiting to observe whether others are
present. The coordination benefits for the victims as well as the libelers in our paper
are endogenously determined through the reports’ credibility, which in turn depends
on the decision maker’s equilibrium Bayesian inferences about different behaviors
of the victims and the libelers. Two reports in our model are not necessarily more
credible than one report: equilibriums with coordination benefit may not exist. In
contrast, in Farrell and Saloner (1985) and Daughety and Reingamum (2011), the
coordination benefit is exogenously assumed.
Pei and Strulovici (2019), a recent working paper, also studies the credibility of
allegations with no hard evidence. It focuses on the incentive of a strategic criminal to commit crime on multiple potential victims. The victims and nonvictims all
choose whether or not to report simultaneously, so an allegation cannot be delayed
in their setup. A nonvictim (who may have a libeling incentive) in that setup thinks
that it is likely that there are other victims, while a victim thinks that it is less likely
that there are other victims because it is in the interest of the criminal to refrain from
abusing widely to avoid multiple allegations. So, contrary to our setting, that libeler
believes the chance of having a corroborator to be bigger than a true victim believes.
Because of this, the crime allegation becomes arbitrarily uninformative as the punishment level for the criminal goes up.
This article is also related to Chassang and Miquel (2014), a study of unverifiable
reporting by whistle-blowers. That study takes a mechanism design approach, in
which the cost of reporting arises endogenously as retaliation from the accused. In
that model there is a single monitor who may potentially report on inappropriate
behavior of an agent. Our article focuses more on the incentive issues that arise
when more than one victim (or more than one libeler) can make allegations against
the same agent in a dynamic setting. We adopt a reduced-form approach by taking
the distribution of reporting costs as given, but there is discounting in reporting
costs if accusers make delayed reports. For sexual harassment in the workplace, the
exogenous reporting costs in our model may reflect the possibility of retaliation by
the accused or by the employer,11 and these costs can be substantially lower if the
accuser has left the firm by the time he or she makes a delayed report.
Chamley and Gale (1994) studies a model of endogenous delay in a framework
in which there is informational externality but no payoff externality. That paper
shows that potential investors may delay their projects in the hope of learning
about the existence of other potential investors. The model exhibits clustering
in investment decisions, similar to the appearance of follow-on reports after the
first allegation is made in our model. In our model of allegations about sexual
crimes, the externality involved is a direct payoff externality coming from the
possibility of corroboration. Delay may also occur in the investment game in Gale
11
In a sample of 86 state workers studied in Loy and Stewart (1984), 62 percent reported retaliation by their
employers following their responses to harassment.
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(1995), because the benefit of investing increases in the number of investors, and
investing early before the others is money losing initially. Gale (1995) finds that in
some equilibrium there is an encouragement effect: investing early encourages
others to invest. The literature on the dynamic provision of public goods (e.g.,
Fershtman and Nitzan 1991, Marx and Matthews 2000) also focuses on payoff
externalities, but the existence of other players is not taken to be uncertain in that
literature or in Gale (1995). Furthermore, our article analyzes how the endogenous timing of reporting behavior affects the credibility of these reports, which is
not an issue in the dynamic public goods provision problem.
In Section I of the article, we lay out the setup of our signaling game. Section II
analyzes the equilibrium we are most interested in—a corroboration equilibrium
in which multiple reports may happen on the equilibrium path and some reports
may be delayed. We provide a brief discussion of other types of equilibria in
Section III. In Section IV, we extend the basic model in different ways and discuss
how these modifications affect the analysis and our main conclusions. Our formal
model provides a framework to study a recently developed reporting system of
sexual crimes: the online information escrow (Ayres and Unkovic 2012). Such an
analysis is developed in Section V of the article. An information escrow allows
people to place allegations into an escrow on the condition that the allegations are
transferred to the authorities if and only if a prespecified number of allegations
are lodged against the same person. A system, using a p respecified number of
two, called the “Callisto reporting system,” has been developed into operation and
was adopted by eight universities by 2017.12 The basic idea is that information
escrows can remove victims’ incentive to wait for corroboration. We point out,
however, that the credibility of two reports from a Callisto system is lower than
the credibility of two reports outside a Callisto system. Depending on the standard
of credibility expected by the authorities to take action, forcing all reports to go
through the Callisto system may sometimes cause victims to be less forthcoming
in reporting crimes than without the Callisto system.
I. The Model

An agent A
 is active for two periods. Agent Acan be of two types: “guilty”
or “innocent.” The prior probability that A
 is a guilty type is μ
 0. With proba hurts a person (and therefore breaks the
bility 1 − μ0 , Ais innocent. Guilty A
law) with some probability in each period. We call the victim harmed in the
first period V1and the victim harmed in the second period V2. If Ais innocent,
a potential libeler holding a grudge against Aappears with some probability in
each period. We call the potential libeler who emerged in the first period L1 and
the one who emerged in the second period L2. In the basic model the behavior
of A is nonstrategic.13 The focus of our analysis is the behavior of victims and
12

Further information about this system is available at https://www.projectcallisto.org.
In Section IVC, we discuss the case where the guilty agent strategically chooses whether or not to commit a
crime in each period and the innocent one strategically chooses whether or not to exercise caution to avoid being
libeled. The qualitative results remain the same.
13
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p otential libelers. The existence of victims and the existence of potential libelers
are mutually exclusive in the basic model.14 Table 1 shows the probability of existence of victims and potential libelers given the two states.
Table 1—Probability of Different Scenarios of Existence of Victims and Potential Libelers
Guilty A

Innocent A


V1 

V2
No V2

pλv

(1 − p)λv

No V1 

(1 − p)λv

1 − (2 − p)λv

L1 

L2
No L2

qλl

(1 − q)λl

No L1 

(1 − q)λl

1 − (2 − q)λl

The entry in each cell represents the probability of the corresponding combination. All parameters—p, q, λv, and λl —are between 0 and 1. For example, if A is
guilty, the probability that both V1 and V2  exist is pλv. Note that the marginal probability that V
 1 exists is λv, and the marginal probability that V2 exists is also λv. Each
victim knows that she is hurt by the guilty agent A. On the basis of this knowledge,
she assigns conditional probability pthat another victim exists in the other period.
A higher value of p indicates a higher degree of correlation across the two periods.
As we mention in the introduction, many sexual crimes are perpetrated by repeat
offenders.15 On the other hand, if an innocent agent inadvertently offends another
person, there is no presumption that this will happen again in the next period. We
capture this difference by the following crucial assumption.
ASSUMPTION 1: p > q.
Suppose Ais a guilty type. If V1 and V2 do not exist, then nothing happens. Because
crimes are perpetrated in secrecy (unless there is a report of the crime), the victim
does not know whether A
 had committed a similar crime before, nor whether A
  will
commit a similar crime in the future. We capture this uncertainty by assuming that Vt
(for t = 1, 2) does not know whether she lives in period 1 or period 2. Ex ante, she
assigns probability 1/2to each of these two possibilities.16
A victim derives utility from getting Aarrested. We normalize this payoff to 1 .
However, reporting a crime is costly. We denote the cost of reporting by c and assume
that it is an independent draw from the uniform distribution on [0, 1]. A victim knows
her own cost c, but outsiders do not observe her cost. The victim applies a discount
factor δ ≤ 1to benefits that are obtained or costs that are incurred a period later.
All reports are public.

14
A more natural story is to let a guilty agent face both victims and potential libelers and an innocent one face
only potential libelers. In Section IVB, we show that this difference between the guilty and the innocent alone can
generate credibility of a report.
15
Groth, Longo, and McFadin (1982) finds that the majority of sexual crime offenders had been convicted more
than once for a sexual assault. Moreover, on average, they admitted to having committed two to five times as many
sex crimes for which they were not apprehended.
16
Alternatively, we can allow each victim to know whether she is harmed in period 1 or period 2, which will
not change the main results. We maintain the uncertain timing assumption in our basic model for its realism and its
simpler notations. The case of known timing is briefly discussed in Appendix B.
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Victim V1 is harmed by A
 in period 1 (although she does not know that she lives
in period 1). She can lodge a public allegation once, either in period 1 or in period 2.
First, she can report the crime immediately in period 1. Let α(c)represent the probability that she chooses to immediately report the crime, and let a ≡ E [α(c)], where
the expectation is taken over possible realizations of c . Thus, ais the ex ante probability that a victim will immediately report a crime in the absence of a prior report
against agent A
 . Second, if V
 1does not report in period 1, she can lodge a delayed
report at the end of period 2, after learning whether or not another victim has made
an allegation against A. We let αˆ 1(c)represent the probability that V1 lodges a
delayed report in period 2 if she has learned that another complaint has been made,
and let α̃ 1(c)represent the probability that she lodges a delayed report in period 2 if
no other victim has made a complaint.
Victim V2 is harmed in period 2. She can lodge a complaint in period 2. If no one
 1 or V2 . In this case, her
has accused Abefore, then V
 2does not know whether she is V
strategy is the same as that of V
 1in period 1, i.e., she reports the crime immediately
with probability α
 (c), but she will have no chance to lodge a delayed report because
 , then V2 
she lives in the last period.17 If someone has lodged a complaint against A
observes this report and knows that she lives in period 2. We use αˆ 2(c)to represent
the probability that V2 complains against A, knowing that there is a prior allegation
against him.
Potential libelers (if they exist) hold a grudge against an innocent agent A. They
derive a payoff of 1 from getting A
 arrested. Their costs of lodging a complaint are
independent draws from the uniform distribution on [0, 1], and their discount factor
is the same δ as used by the victims. In other words, the payoff structure for potential
libelers is identical to that for true victims. A priori, it is not obvious whether the
costs and benefits of making an allegation are higher or lower for potential libelers
than for true victims. We make the assumption that their payoffs are identical to
highlight the difficulty of making inferences when there are no systematic differences in payoffs.18 For convenience, we sometimes refer to potential libelers simply
as libelers, even though they may not choose to make an allegation in equilibrium.
The information structure for libelers mirrors that for victims. If no prior complaint has been filed against A, a libeler does not know whether she is L1 or L2, and
she lodges a complaint immediately with probability β
 (c). We define b ≡ E [ β(c)].
All other notations parallel those for victims: L
 1files a delayed report with proba ̃ 1(c) if L2 
bility βˆ 1(c) after L2 ’s complaint; L1 files a delayed report with probability β
ˆ
  2(c) after L1’s
does not file a complaint; and L
 2files a complaint with probability β
complaint. The only difference in the information between a libeler and a victim is
that the former knows Ais innocent, whereas the latter knows Ais guilty.
If a report alleges that a crime happened in the same period, we call it an undelayed report. If a report alleges that a crime happened a period earlier, we call it a
delayed report. The decision maker (the police authorities, for example) initially
also does not know which period she is in, and assigns prior probability 1/2to either
possibility. If no one makes a complaint against A
  (we denote this event by ϕ
 ) , the
17
18

For example, we may assume that the whereabouts of agent Aare no longer traceable after period 2.
In Section IVD, we show that such differences, if they exist, would lead to predicable outcomes.
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Period 2

Arrest
or not

Crime

Report
by V2

Report
by V1

Arrest
or not

Figure 1. The Timeline When AIs Guilty
Notes: This figure shows the case in which A
 strikes a victim in each period. If there is no crime, there is no reporting decision. If there is no report, there is no arrest decision.

decision maker cannot arrest A
 . Whether a report is delayed or not is observable to
the decision maker. She decides whether or not to arrest agent A
 after the following
observable outcomes: (i) there was only one undelayed report in the current period
(event r ), (ii) there was only one delayed report in the current period (denoted R) ,
(iii) there was only one undelayed report in the previous period and no report in the
current period (event r ϕ), (iv) there was one undelayed report in the previous period
and another undelayed report in the current period (event rr), and (v) there was one
undelayed report in the current period followed by one delayed report (event r R).
For  ∈ {r, R, rϕ, rr, rR }, let μ( )represent the decision maker’s posterior belief
 . For simplicity, we just assume that the
that Ais a guilty type conditional on event 
decision maker is bound to arrest Aas soon as μ( )is greater than or equal to some
threshold standard μ
ˆ , which is taken to be exogenous.19 The game ends at the end of
period 2 or whenever A
 is arrested. When the game moves on to the second period,
if a victim or a libeler finds that she can still report after a period has passed, she
basically knows that she is in period 2. Similarly, if a decision maker finds that she
can still make an arrest after a period has passed, she knows that she is in period 2.
The timing of the game when Ais guilty is illustrated in Figure 1. The timing of
the game when Ais innocent is the same, with Vt replaced by Lt for t = 1, 2.
II. Corroboration Equilibrium with Occasional Delay

In this section, we focus on an equilibrium in which events r rand r Rboth appear
with positive probability on the equilibrium path; that is, it is possible to observe
multiple allegations against the same agent, and sometimes these allegations are
delayed. In such an equilibrium, both rrand rRlead to an arrest; otherwise, they
will not appear in equilibrium. Moreover, the events ror rϕwill not lead to an arrest,
because if they do, then no one will follow up with a report.
In other words, we look for an equilibrium in which Ais arrested if and only
if there are two allegations against him. We refer to this type of equilibrium as
a “corroboration equilibrium with occasional delay,” or simply a corroboration
equilibrium.

19

The threshold standard can be determined by the decision maker’s costs of making type I and type II errors.
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Let ℓ( )represent the likelihood ratio of event 
  (given the guilty type relative to the innocent type). For any fixed prior μ0, there is a monotone relationship between μ( )and ℓ( ). Thus, one can also say that the decision rule of the
authorities is to arrest A
 if and only if ℓ ( ) ≥ ℓˆ , where ℓˆ   = μˆ (1 − μ0 )/( μ0 (1 − μˆ )).
We sometimes refer to ℓˆ  as the standard of proof. The existence of a corroboration
equilibrium requires ℓ(rr)and ℓ(rR)to be greater than or equal to the standard of
proof ℓˆ , and ℓ(r), ℓ(R), and ℓ(rϕ)to be less than ℓˆ . We proceed by assuming these
conditions and then verify that they indeed hold in equilibrium.
Given the assumed conditions of the likelihood ratios described above, a silent victim V1 who observes another person lodging a report against Ain period 2 will surely
lodge a delayed complaint, because doing so gives a payoff of 1at a cost c ≤ 1.
Therefore, αˆ 1(c) = 1for any c . Similarly, a victim V2who knows of a prior complaint against A
 will also lodge a complaint upon being hurt. Therefore, αˆ 2(c) = 1
for any c . On the other hand, a silent victim V
 1has no incentive to report against A
at the end of period 2 if no other victim has come forward. Therefore, α̃ 1(c) = 0
for any c. The payoff structure of libelers is identical to the payoff structure of true
victims. Thus, βˆ 1(c) = βˆ 2 (c) = 1 and β̃ 1(c) = 0for any c.
Consider now a victim of A
 who is just harmed in the current period and has not
seen a prior accusation against A. For convenience, we label her a new victim (even
though she may be the second victim if the first one did not report). A new victim
can entertain three possibilities:
(i) Another victim does not exist. The probability of this event (conditional on
her knowledge of her own existence) is (1 − p) λv/λv   = 1 − p.
(ii) She is V
 1, and another victim V2 exists in period 2. The probability (conditional on her knowledge of her own existence) is (1/2) pλv/λv   = (1/2) p.
(iii) She is 
V2, and another victim V1exists but did not report. The probability (conditional on her knowledge of her own existence) is
(1/2) pλv(1 − a)/λv   = (1/2) p(1 − a).
The sum of these probabilities is 1 − (1/2) pa.
In the first eventuality, one report is not sufficient to arrest A
 because ℓ(r)
< ℓˆ . Therefore, reporting immediately is futile (i.e., the payoff is 0 ). In the second eventuality, reporting immediately will encourage the future victim V
 2 to report
because αˆ 2(c) = 1. The discounted benefit is δ. In the third eventuality, reporting
immediately will cause the past victim V
 1to come forward with a delayed report
 in the same period, with a payoff
because αˆ 1(c) = 1. This leads to the arrest of A
of 1. Therefore, if the new victim has reporting cost c , the expected net payoff from
reporting immediately is
(1/2) p(1 − a)
(1/2) p
1−p
_________
  
    1 − c].
(1)	 _______   [ −c]  +  _______   [ δ − c]  +    
1 − (1/2) pa
1 − (1/2) pa
1 − (1/2) pa [

If the new victim does not report immediately, then only in the second eventuality can she follow up with a delayed report provided that V2 makes a complaint
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against 
A
. The probability that 
V2will make a complaint conditional on this
eventuality is a , and the discounted net benefit is δ (1 − c). Therefore, the expected
net payoff from not reporting immediately is
(1/2) p(1 − a)
(1/2) p
1−p
  
  
    0 .
(2)	 _______   [ 0]  +  _______   [ aδ(1 − c)]  +  _________
1 − (1/2) pa
1 − (1/2) pa
1 − (1/2) pa [ ]
Let f (c, a; p)represent the payoff difference between reporting immediately and
not reporting immediately for a new victim, given that other victims are adopting the
strategies αˆ 1(c) = 1, αˆ 2 (c) = 1, α̃ 1 (c) = 0, and E[α(c)] = a:

1−p
(3) 
f (c, a; p)  =  _______   [ −c]
1 − (1/2) pa

(1/2) p(1 − a)
(1/2) p
+  _______   [ δ − c − aδ(1 − c)]  +  _________
  
  
    1 − c].
1 − (1/2) pa
1 − (1/2) pa [

For any a and p , f (⋅ , a; p)is strictly decreasing, with f (0, a; p) > 0 > f (1, a; p).
Therefore, there exists cˆ (a, p)satisfying f (cˆ (a, p), a; p) = 0such that the best
response is to report immediately (i.e., choose α(c) = 1) if and only if c ≤ cˆ (a, p).
Because a = E [α(c)]and the distribution of c is uniform, equilibrium requires
cˆ (a  ∗, p) = a  ∗.
In a similar fashion, the payoff difference between reporting immediately and not
reporting immediately for a new libeler (i.e., a libeler who does not observe a prior
report against A) is f (c, b; q). Equilibrium requires that f (b  ∗, b  ∗; q) = 0, with the
new libeler choosing β(c) = 1if and only if c ≤ b  ∗.
Before contrasting the behavior of a new victim and a new libeler, we will first
point out two important incentives reflected in the net benefit function f (c, a; p):
strategic substitution and the encouragement effect.
LEMMA 1 (Strategic Substitution): The net benefit f (c, a; p) of reporting immediately is decreasing in a.
If other new victims are more likely to report immediately (a increases), then
a new victim is less likely to do so (cˆ (a, p) decreases). This strategic substitution
in reporting immediately among new victims (or new libelers) reflects the public
good nature of crime allegations when a single report is not sufficient to lead to
arrest. Each victim who has not observed an allegation against Ahas an incentive
to take a wait-and-see approach. First, if another report later comes to surface, the
new victim can reduce the cost by lodging a delayed report, which is beneficial
when δ < 1. Second, if the other victim does not even exist, the new victim can
eliminate the cost of making a futile report. The new victim assigns a higher probability to the nonexistence of the other victim when a is higher. The downside of
this wait-and-see approach for a new victim is that Amay not be arrested if (i) the
new victim is V2 and V1 did not report, or (ii) the new victim is V1 and V2  does not
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choose to be the first one to report. Both of these two events are less likely when a 
is higher, so the downside risk is believed to be smaller when a is higher, which
explains the strategic substitution effect.
LEMMA 2 (Encouragement Effect): The net benefit f (c, a; p) of reporting immediately is increasing in p.
It may appear that the freeriding problem20 is more severe when the other victim
is more likely to exist—in equation (2) the payoff from not reporting is increasing
in p. However, freeriding is not the only incentive in our setting, as the model also
exhibits complementarity between the possibly two victims through an encouragement effect. First, if a new victim is V1, and if V2exists, then by reporting immediately the new victim raises the probability that the future victim V2 will report
 2, but V1
the crime from E[α(c)] = a to αˆ 2(c) = 1. Second, if a new victim is V
did not report, then by reporting immediately the new victim raises the probability
 ̃ 1(c) = 0 to αˆ 1(c) = 1. These
that V1 will make a delayed follow-on report from α
two effects imply that the payoff of reporting immediately in equation (1) increases
in p. Lemma 2 shows that the impact of pon equation (1) dominates the impact on
equation (2); so, taken together, a higher chance of the existence of another victim
gives more incentive for a new victim to report immediately. The intuition can be
understood by considering the extreme case when δ = 1. When reporting early,
one is sure to encourage the future victim if that victim exists. When reporting late,
one can only freeride on the future victim if that victim exists and also reports. The
chance of the latter is clearly smaller because the future victim is willing to lead only
if her cost of reporting is small enough but is always willing to follow.
The proofs of Lemmas 1 and 2 are provided in Appendix A. Note that these
results are generally valid for any distribution of reporting cost. Lemmas 1 and 2
also apply to the incentive of new libelers. Moreover, Lemma 2 implies that the
encouragement effect is stronger for new victims than for new libelers because p is
greater than q. This leads to the following result.
PROPOSITION 1: In a corroboration equilibrium, new victims report immediately against Awith a strictly higher probability than do new libelers. Moreover, a  ∗
increases in pand δ, and b  ∗ increases in qand δ .
PROOF:
In a corroboration equilibrium, a  ∗ satisfies F (a  ∗; p) = 0, where
(4) 
F(a; p)  ≡ f ( a, a; p)
1/2
=  ___________   [ −a(2 − pa)  + pδ(1 − a(1 − a))  + p(1 − a)].
1 − (1/2) pa

20
When freeriding on the other accuser, one eventually still needs to file a report to corroborate if the other
reports, but filing later saves expected reporting costs.
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Since f (c, a; p)is decreasing in a  (Lemma 1) and in c , F (a; p)is decreasing in a .
Also, F
 (0; p) > 0 > F (1; p)
. Hence, there exists a unique a ∗  ∈ (0, 1) such
∗
that F (a  ; p) = 0. Lemma 2 implies that F (a; p)increases in p. By the implicit
function theorem, an increase in p raises a  ⁎. Because the equilibrium b  ∗ satisfies
 (a; p)increases in δ , a  ∗ is
F (b  ∗; q) = 0, p > q implies a  ∗  > b  ∗. Finally, because F
∗
increasing in δ . Likewise, b  is increasing in δ . ∎
The fact that 
a  ∗  > b  ∗in a corroboration equilibrium lends credibility
to allegations about sexual crimes. If victims and libelers report with equal
probability, the likelihood ratio of an undelayed report (event r) would be simply λv/λl. We can take λv /λlto be the “face value” of a crime allegation. However,
Proposition 1 implies that the likelihood ratio in the event of an undelayed report is
. The additional credibility is the result of equilibλv  a  ∗/(λl b  ∗) > λv /λl
rium inference, coming from the reasoning that true victims are more likely
to make an undelayed report than libelers are. Furthermore, we also have the
following result.
PROPOSITION 2: In a corroboration equilibrium, two undelayed reports against
A are assigned a greater credibility than one undelayed report corroborated by a
delayed report.
PROOF:
Suppose agent 
Ais guilty. The event 
 = rRis observed only
when both 
V1 and V2 exist, V1 has cost above a  ∗, and V2 has cost below
a  ∗. The probability of this event is pλv  a  ∗(1 − a  ∗), and the likelihood ratio is ℓ (rR)
. The event 
 = rris observed only when
= pλv a  ∗(1 − a  ∗)/(qλl b  ∗(1 − b  ∗))
both V1  and V2  exist, and V1 has cost below a  ∗ (V2will always report when V1 has
reported in the earlier period). The likelihood ratio is ℓ (rr) = pλv  a  ∗/(qλl b  ∗). By
Proposition 1, a  ∗  > b  ∗, which implies ℓ(rr) > ℓ(rR). ∎
Proposition 2 is consistent with common attacks on the credibility of accusations that surface long after the alleged crimes. In a corroboration equilibrium, true
victims are more likely than libelers to lodge an undelayed complaint against A
if there is no prior complaint against him, but everyone (true victim or not) can
secure an arrest of Aif there is already a prior complaint. Because libelers are
more likely to take a wait-and-see approach, the public rationally believes that
delayed reports are more likely to be “opportunistic” and assigns less credibility
to them.
PROPOSITION 3: A corroboration equilibrium exists if and only if
λv ( 2 − p)a  ∗ ____________
pλv a  ∗(1 − a  ∗)
∗ –∗
___________
ˆ
    .
  ,     
	ℓ   ∈ 
(ℓ_  , ℓ   ] ≡   
( λl( 2 − q)b  ∗ qλl b  ∗(1 − b  ∗)]

Moreover, there exists p– (δ ), which is decreasing in δ and greater than 2/3, such that
–
the range ( _
ℓ   ∗, ℓ   ∗  ]is nonempty for all p ≤ p– (δ ).
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PROOF:
Suppose Ais a guilty type. Given the strategy profile in a corroboration equilibrium, there are two possibilities that lead to the event r : (i) the current period is
period 1 and V
 1 reported (this happens with probability (1/2) λv a  ∗  ); and (ii) the
current period is period 2, V
 1 didn’t exist, and V2  reported (this happens with probability ( 1/2)(1 − p) λv  a  ∗  ). Therefore, the probability of observing rgiven Ais guilty
is (1/2) λv  a  ∗(2 − p). Similarly, the probability of observing r given Ais innocent
 1 exists and makes
is (1/2) λl b  ∗(2 − q). This gives ℓ (r) = ℓ_  ∗. The event rϕhappens if V
an immediate report but V
 2 does not exist, which occurs with probability ( 1 − p)λv  a  ∗.
The corresponding likelihood ratio is ℓ (r ϕ) = (1 − p) λv  a  ∗/((1 − q) λl b  ∗) < ℓ_  ∗.
–
In the proof of Proposition 2, we show that ℓ (rR) = ℓ   ∗ < ℓ(rr). The event R is
off equilibrium. We can assign an o ff-equilibrium belief such that ℓ (R) < ℓˆ . This
establishes that a corroboration equilibrium exists if and only if ℓˆ   ∈ (ℓ(r), ℓ(rR)].
–
The range ( _
ℓ   ∗, ℓ   ∗  ]is nonempty if and only if
p 1 − a  ∗ 
2−p

q 1 − b  ∗ 
2−q

(
)
(
)
	 _  >  _  .

The left-hand side of the inequality above is equal to the right-hand side when
p = q. Because p > q, it suffices to show that the left-hand side is increasing in p
, which is equivalent to
∂ a    > 0.
(5)	2(1 − a  ∗)  − p(2 − p)  _
∂p
∗

By implicit differentiation of (4),

(
))
(
)(
∂ a    =  _____________________
2 a  
_______________________
   ,
  
  
   
	 _
∗    =    
∗
∗

∂p

 1 + δ  1 − a  ∗ 1 − a  ∗  
2 + (1 + δ)p(1 − 2 a  )

∗

p(2 + (1 + δ)p(1 − 2 a  ))

where the second equality holds because F
 (a  ∗; p) = 0implies 
(1 + δ )(1 −
∗
∗
∗
a  (1 − a  )) = 2 a  /p. Suppose pand δare such that a  ∗  < 1/2. Then, we have
∂ a  ∗/∂ p < a  ∗/p, and therefore the left-hand side of (5) is positive when a  ∗  < 1/2.
From the equation F (a  ∗; p) = 0, we can verify that a  ∗  = 1/2when p = 2/3
pand 
δ (Proposition 1), 
q < p ≤ 2/3
and 
δ = 1. Because a  ∗increases in 
implies b  ∗  < a  ∗  < 1/2for any δ ≤ 1.
This argument also shows that we must have a  ∗  > 1/2 whenever
∗
∗
( 1 + δ)(1 − a  (1 − a  ))
_____________________
   = 0.
	
h(a  ∗, p, δ)  ≡ 2(1 − a  ∗)  − p(2 − p)    
  
2 + (1 + δ)p(1 − 2 a  ∗)

For a  ∗  > 1/2, h(a  ∗, p, δ )is decreasing in a  ∗, p, and δ . By Proposition 1, this implies
H( p, δ ) ≡ h(a  ∗( p, δ ), p, δ )is decreasing in p and δ . Thus, the locus p– (δ ) that satisfies
H( p– (δ ), δ ) = 0is decreasing in δ, with H( p, δ ) > 0for all p < p– (δ ). ∎
Proposition 3 states that a corroboration equilibrium exists whenever the standard
of proof ℓˆ falls in the range ( ℓ(r), ℓ(rR )]. Because r ris more credible than r R, and r 
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is more credible than rϕ, the accused agent Awill be arrested if and only if there are
two reports lodged against him.
The range (ℓ(r), ℓ(rR)]may be empty, in which case a corroboration equilibrium
does not exist. This may occur because, for very high values of pand δ, the event rR
is even less credible than r.21 The reason is that r Rreveals that the first accuser chose
not to report right away. Because libelers are more likely to take this w
 ait-and-see
approach, this brings down the belief, reflected in the ratio (1 − a  ∗)/(1 − b  ∗). If
both pand δ are close to 1 , then 1 − a  ∗would be close to 0, causing an undelayed
report followed by a delayed report to be less credible than just one undelayed report.
Proposition 3 also establishes that the existence of a corroboration equilibrium is guaranteed whenever por 
δis not too large. Specifically, for
any δ, a corroboration equilibrium always exists if p ≤ 2/3. Suppose, for example, that λ
 v  = λl  = 0.2, p = 0.6, q = 0.2, and δ = 1. Then, in a corroboration equilibrium, a  ∗  = 0.41 and b  ∗  = 0.17. In other words, about 59 percent
of the new victims do not report the crimes against them immediately, and about
83 percent of the potential libelers do not libel immediately. In such an equilibrium,
ℓ(rr) = 7.24and ℓ(rR) = 5.14. A corroboration equilibrium exists if and only if
ℓˆ   ∈ (1.88, 5.14]. If victims and libelers were to always lodge a complaint immediately (e.g., if they are n onstrategic), the credibility of two undelayed reports
would be ℓ(rr) = pλv /(qλl) = 3. Thus, for ℓˆ   ∈ (3, 5.14], agent Awould never
get arrested if victims and libelers behaved n onstrategically by always reporting
immediately, but Awill be arrested with some probability in the corroborated equilibrium of our model. More generally, p ≤ 2/3 implies a  ∗  < 1/2, and hence
a  ∗(1 − a  ∗) ≥ b  ∗(1 − b  ∗). This ensures that ℓ (rR) ≥ pλv/(qλl). The fact that, in a
corroboration equilibrium, true victims are more likely to make allegations against A
than libelers are lends credence to such allegations.
If the existences of V1  and V2are very positively correlated (e.g., when p > 2/3),
a corroboration equilibrium still exists when future costs and benefits are sufficiently
discounted. This is because a lower δ gives a new victim more incentive to wait and
see and thus reduces a  ∗to ensure that ℓ(rR) > ℓ(r). Specifically, when δ ≤ 1/3,
we have a  ∗  ≤ 1/2for any value of p. This will guarantee that a corroboration equilibrium exists.
The criminal justice system is imperfect and has to strike a balance between the
possibilities of punishing the innocent (type I error) and letting go the guilty (type II
error). In our model, type I error occurs because libelers wrongly accuse A
  even
though he has not broken the law. Given that there is at least one libeler, the probability that an innocent agent A
 will be arrested in a corroboration equilibrium is:
q
(6)	Pr[type I]  =  _ (1 − (1 − b  ∗)  2),
2−q
where the fraction is the probability that there are two potential libelers given that
there is at least one, and the second term is the probability that at least one of L
 1
21
For example, when λv = λl, p = 0.9, q = 0.8, and δ = 0.95, we have a* = 0.69and b* = 0.59. Then
ℓ(r) ≈ 1.07 > 0.99 = ℓ(rR).
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and L2has a reporting cost less than b  ∗ (which will lead to two reports because
the other one will follow up). Similarly, given that there is at least one victim, the
probability that the evidence against a guilty agent Adoes not reach the standard of
proof in a corroboration equilibrium is:
2(1 − p)
p
(7)	Pr[type II]  =  _ (1 − a  ∗)  2  +  _  .
2−p
2−p
The first term is the conditional probability that neither V
 1 nor V2 lodges a complaint. The second term is the conditional probability that A
 has hurt only one victim, so the evidence is not sufficient to reach the threshold regardless of whether the
victim lodges a complaint or not.
PROPOSITION 4: In a corroboration equilibrium, the probability of type I error
increases in qand δ, and the probability of type II error decreases in pand δ.
PROOF:
From equation (6), the probability of type I error increases in q and in b  ∗.
Proposition 1 establishes that b  ∗increases in q and δ . Therefore, Pr[type I ] increases
in qδ. From equation (7), Pr[type II ]decreases in pand in a  ∗. Because a  ∗ increases
in pand δ , Pr[type II ]decreases in p and δ. ∎
An increase in the correlation of repeated offense p by a guilty agent Ahas two
effects on the probability of his getting away without punishment. The first effect
is mechanical: a higher p raises the chance that there are two victims to report his
crime. The second effect works through the response of the victims: a victim who
expects the existence of another victim is more likely to report the crime through the
encouragement effect. Both effects tend to reduce the probability of not having A
arrested.
In a corroboration equilibrium, new victims face a trade-off between encouraging others to report the crime and delaying to pay the cost of reporting. Greater
patience δ makes the latter option less attractive and hence increases the probability that they report immediately. When people are more forthcoming in making an
allegation against A
 , the probability of type I error increases and the probability of
type II error decreases.
III. Other Types of Equilibria

A. Other Equilibria with a Corroboration Flavor
In the previous section, we focus on corroboration equilibrium, in which agent A
is arrested if and only if there are two reports against him. The corroboration equilibrium, provided that it exists, is not the only equilibrium in our model. Multiple
equilibria exist because beliefs are self-confirming. For example, if rRdoes not
lead to arrest, then no one has an incentive to make a delayed report. Because rR
does not occur in equilibrium in this case, we can assign off-equilibrium beliefs
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such that rRis not credible enough to cause an arrest, hence confirming the equilibrium construction. In this subsection, we consider two other types of equilibria
in which corroboration is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for making an
arrest. In the first type, agent Ais arrested only when both reports against him are
undelayed. We call this an rr-equilibrium. In the second type, agent Ais arrested
only when one report is undelayed and the other is delayed. We call this an
rR-equilibrium.
In an rr-equilibrium, the event r Rdoes not lead to an arrest. Therefore, a silent V
 1
who has not reported in period 1 has no incentive to file a delayed report against A

upon learning that V
 2has reported. Unlike in a corroboration equilibrium, we therefore have αˆ 1(c) = 0for all c. Nevertheless, as in a corroboration equilibrium, we
still have α̃ 1(c) = 0 (V1will not report in period 2 if no one reports against A)
and αˆ 2(c) = 1 (V2will report if she learns that V1has already made a report) in
an r r-equilibrium.
We continue to use ato denote the probability of reporting right away by a new
victim, and we will use arr to denote its equilibrium value. Likewise, brr is the equilibrium probability of reporting immediately by a new libeler. In an rr-equilibrium,
reporting immediately gives a new victim a payoff of
(1/2) p
	
−c +  _______   [ δ ].
1 − (1/2) pa
Not reporting gives her a payoff of 0 , as delaying the report will certainly lead to no
arrest. The equilibrium probability of a new victim reporting right away when there
is no prior report is the unique solution for a to:
(1/2) p
(8)	Frr (a; p)  ≡  _______  δ − a = 0.
1 − (1/2) pa
Comparing (8) to (4) in the previous section, we see that both the benefit from
reporting immediately and the benefit from delaying to report are smaller in an
rr-equilibrium than in a corroboration equilibrium. Moreover, substituting the equi (a; p)from equalibrium value of a
 rr obtained from equation (8) and evaluating F
tion (4) at this value, we obtain
1/2
	
F(arr
 ; p)  =  _________
    [ p(1 − arr)(1 − δ arr
 )]  > 0.
1 − (1/2) p arr
This implies a
 rr  < a  ∗, because F ( ⋅ ; p)is s ingle crossing from above. Therefore,
the overall effect of not allowing corroboration with delay as sufficient grounds for
arrest is to discourage new victims from making a report immediately, as it removes
the chance that an immediate report will encourage past victims who did not report
to come forward by filing delayed reports.
Consider next an rR-equilibrium. In such an equilibrium, because a second
undelayed report will not lead to arrest, we have αˆ 2(c) = 0 (whereas we still have
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αˆ 1(c) = 1 and α̃ 1(c) = 0, as in a corroboration equilibrium). The payoff to a new
victim from reporting immediately is
(1/2) p(1 − a)
	
−c +  _________
  
  
    1 ,
1 − (1/2) pa [ ]
which comes from the possibility that V
 1exists but has not reported. On the other
hand, not reporting gives a new victim a payoff of
(1/2) p
	 _______   [ aδ(1 − c)],
1 − (1/2) pa
which comes from the possibility of reporting later if V2exists and makes a report.
Let arRbe the equilibrium probability that a new victim reports immediately, and
let brRbe the equilibrium probability that a new libeler reports immediately. Then,
arRis given by the unique solution for ato the following equality:
(1/2) p(1 − a)
(1/2) p
(9)	FrR(a; p)  ≡  _________
  
  
 − a −  _______  aδ(1 − a)  = 0.
1 − (1/2) pa
1 − (1/2) pa
Comparing (9) to the corresponding equation (4), which characterizes a  ∗in a corroboration equilibrium, because the payoff from reporting immediately is reduced but
the payoff from not reporting remains unchanged, we have arR  < a  ∗.
PROPOSITION 5:
–

(i ) There exists a n onempty interval ( _
ℓ rr, ℓ rr  ] such that an rr-equilibrium exists
if and only if ℓˆ  is in that interval. In this equilibrium, brr  < arr  < a  ∗.
–
–
ℓ rr  > ℓ_  ∗.
Moreover, ℓ rr  > ℓ   ∗, and if p ≤ 2/3, then _
–

(ii ) There exists a nonempty interval ( _
ℓ rR, ℓ rR  ]such that an rR-equilibrium exists
if and only if ℓˆ  is in that interval. In this equilibrium, brR  < arR  < a  ∗.
–
–
Moreover, ℓ rR  > ℓ   ∗, and if p ≤ 2/3, then _
ℓ rR  > ℓ_  ∗.
The proof of Proposition 5 is in Appendix A. In both the r r-equilibrium and the
rR-equilibrium, new victims are less likely to report immediately compared with
the case in a corroboration equilibrium. Furthermore, because αˆ 1(c) = 0in an
rr-equilibrium and αˆ 2(c) = 0in an rR-equilibrium (these two quantities are both
equal to 1in a corroboration equilibrium), the overall probability that a victim or
a libeler will make an allegation is lower compared with that in a corroboration
equilibrium.
Compared with a corroboration equilibrium, an rr
-equilibrium and an
rR-equilibrium both reduce type I error but increase type II error, for two reasons:
(i) each reduces the set of events under which Ais arrested, and (ii) the probability

238

AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL: MICROECONOMICS

FEBRUARY 2020

that a new victim or new libeler will report immediately is lower. On the other hand,
Proposition 5 also shows that arrests in an r r-equilibrium or an rR-equilibrium are
more credible than the event rRin a corroboration equilibrium (assuming pis not
too large). Thus, even if the standard of proof ℓˆ is so high that a corroboration equilibrium does not exist, it is still possible that the model will admit an r r-equilibrium
or an rR-equilibrium.
The event rRis off the equilibrium path in an rr-equilibrium, and likewise for
the event r rin an rR-equilibrium. Standard refinements are not sufficient to rule out
these two types of equilibria. Nevertheless, because both event r rand event r R are
observed in reality, we believe that the corroboration equilibrium is the most relevant equilibrium to focus on, not r r-equilibrium or rR-equilibrium.
B. Lower Standard of Proof and No-Corroboration Equilibrium
The probabilities of type I and type II errors can be affected by the standard of
proof ℓˆ . Consider the case where one report against agent A
 is sufficient to lead to
arrest. In such a case, no one will have an incentive to file a second report against
the same person, so rrand rRare o ff-equilibrium events. We call this type of equilibrium a no-corroboration equilibrium. The existence of a no-corroboration equilibrium requires ℓ (r) ≥ ℓˆ  and ℓ(R) ≥ ℓˆ . Because the event ris sufficient for arrest,
the event rϕis irrelevant. We first assume that these conditions hold, and we subsequently verify that this is true for some values of ℓˆ .
Suppose agent 
Ais guilty. If a victim of 
Ahas seen a prior
accusation against him, there is no point for her to report because one

αˆ 2 (c) = 0 for
report is s
ufficient to punish A
. Therefore, αˆ 1(c) = 
all c. On the other hand, if a silent victim V1observes no one coming forward
to complain against A
 in period 2, she will make a delayed report because the
event Ris sufficient to lead to arrest. This means that we have α
 ̃ 1(c) = 1 in a
no-corroboration equilibrium.
For a new victim (who does not see a prior accusation against A
 ), the payoff from
reporting immediately is 1 − c. The payoff from not reporting immediately is
(1/2) p
1−p
  1 δ( 1 − c)]  +  _______ 
(10)	 _______   [ _
1 − (1/2) pa 2
1 − (1/2) pa

(1/2) p(1 − a)
	 
× [aδ + (1 − a)δ( 1 − c)]  +  _________
  
  
    1 .
1 − (1/2) pa [ ]

The first fraction is the probability that another victim does not exist. Given this,
there is probability 1/2that she is V1, in which case she lodges a delayed report at
the end of period 2 and gets δ (1 − c). The second fraction is the conditional probability that this victim is V1 and V2  exists. With probability a, V2  reports the crime
 1 lodges
and V1  gets δ, and with probability 1 − a, V2 does not report the crime and V
a delayed report and gets δ(1 − c). The final term is the conditional probability
that she is V
 2 and V1exists but did not report. If she does not report, V1 will lodge a
delayed report and V
 2 gets 1.
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Let fnc
   (c, a; p)represent the difference between 1 − c and (10), and define
   (a, a; p). We have:
Fn c  (a; p) ≡ fnc
1/2
Fnc
 (a; p)  =  _______   [ (1 − a)(2 − pa)
1 − (1/2) pa


− (1 − p)δ( 1 − a)  − pδ(1 − a(1 − a))  − p(1 − a)].

   (1; p) and Fnc
   ( ⋅ ; p)is single crossing from above,
Because Fnc(0; p) > 0 > Fnc
there exists a unique anc such that Fnc  (an c; p) = 0. In a no-corroboration equilibrium, the strategy of a new victim is α(c) = 1 (i.e., report immediately) if and only
  is
if c ≤ anc. Similarly, the strategy of a libeler who sees no prior report against A
β (c) = 1if and only if c ≤ bn c, where Fn c  (bn c; q) = 0.
PROPOSITION 6: A 
no-corroboration equilibrium exists only if ℓˆ   < λv /λl.
Comparing the outcome in a n o-corroboration equilibrium to that in a corroboration equilibrium, the probability of convicting an innocent A is higher, and the
probability of acquitting a guilty Ais lower.
PROOF:
A n o-corroboration equilibrium exists if and only if the standard of proof is lower
than the likelihood ratio corresponding to event ror R, i.e.,
λv  anc(2 − p an c) ___________________
λv( 1 − anc) ( 1 − pan c) 
   
    ,     
    .
	ℓˆ   ≤ ℓ(r)  = min ______________
 l bnc(2 − q bnc
 ) λl(1 − bnc
 )(1 − qbnc)}
{λ
Because rrand rRare off-equilibrium events, we can assign off-equilibrium beliefs
such that ℓ(rr) ≥ 
ℓˆ  and ℓ(rR) ≥ ℓˆ . Given these beliefs, there is no profitable deviation from the strategy profile of a no-corroboration equilibrium. Note that Fnc(a; p) is
single crossing from above and is decreasing in p . Hence, p > q implies an c  < bn c.
This implies that a
 nc(2 − pan c)/(bn c(2 − qbn c)) < 1. Hence, a n o-corroboration
equilibrium exists only if ℓˆ   ≤ ℓ(r) < λv/λl.
If there are two libelers, L
 1either makes an undelayed report or a delayed report
in a no-corroboration equilibrium. If there is only one libeler and this libeler is L2,
she makes an undelayed report with probability bnc. Therefore, the overall probability of type I error in a no-corroboration equilibrium is
2(1 − q) 1 _
q
	 _  +  _ (_
     +   1  bnc),
2 2
2−q
2−q

which is greater than (6). Similarly, the probability of type II error is
2(1 − p) 1
	 _ (_
   (1 − anc
 )),
2
2−p

240

AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL: MICROECONOMICS

FEBRUARY 2020

which is less than (7). ∎
In a no-corroboration equilibrium, there is no “encouragement effect” to motivate a new victim to report immediately in order to induce a future or past victim
to report. As a result, only the f reerider effect is present, and the f reerider effect is
stronger the more likely that another victim exists. Hence a new victim has a higher
incentive to freeride than a new libeler does and, as a result, reports with a lower
probability. This implies that a n o-corroboration equilibrium exists only if the standard of proof ℓˆ is so low that one will be arrested on the basis of a single report even
if the victim and the libeler have the same pooling behavior (i.e., as if they were
nonstrategic). The advantage of having a lower standard of proof is that a guilty
agent is more likely to be punished; the disadvantage is that it comes with a much
higher chance of type I error.
There are other types of equilibria with a no-corroboration flavor. In all
such equilibria, agent 
Ais sometimes arrested when there is only one report
(delayed or not) against him. In the first type, which we call an r-equilibrium,
agent Ais arrested in event r but not in event R
 . In the second type, which we call an
R-equilibrium, agent Ais arrested in event R
 but not in event r . The key features
of these equilibria are quite similar to those for the no-corroboration equilibrium described in Proposition 6. We summarize these features in the following
proposition.
PROPOSITION 7: In an r-equilibrium, new victims report immediately with a lower
probability than do new libelers. In an R-equilibrium, neither new victims nor new
libelers ever report immediately. Each of these two types of equilibria exists only if
the standard of proof ℓˆ  is below λv /λl.
Allowing only one report to lead to arrest eliminates the encouragement effect
for new victims to report immediately. Proposition 7 shows that an r -equilibrium
and an R-equilibrium share the same feature that a victim reports right away with a
lower probability than a libeler when there is no prior report. This adverse selection
of accusers in turn implies that the standard of proof has to be so low (i.e., lower
than λv /λl) that the public is willing to arrest someone knowing that a libeler is
more active in reporting than a victim. Because such a standard of proof seems to us
to be an implausibly low standard, and because we do observe multiple allegations
(rror rR) in reality, we choose to focus on the corroboration equilibrium in the
remainder of this article.
IV. Model Extensions

We have made a number of modeling choices in the basic model to make it sim 2 makes
ple and transparent: V
 1cannot make a delayed report in period 2 before V
her decision, a guilty agent does not face potential libelers, agent A
 is not strategic,
and the victims and libelers have the same payoff structure. These restrictions can
be relaxed without altering our main conclusions. We present the analysis in this
section.
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Figure 2: The Modified Timeline When A
 Is Guilty
Notes: Victim V1 can make a delayed report in period 2 before knowing whether V2reports or not. If V
 2 reports, V1 
will have another chance to make a delayed report before the end of period 2 provided that she has not already done so.

A. Delay of the Initial Report
In our basic model, a delayed report is always preceded by an undelayed report
in a corroboration equilibrium. In reality, sometimes even the first report against an
accused is significantly delayed. For example, the first two allegations of sexual assault
(almost simultaneously in 2016) against Larry Nassar, a former physician for the USA
Gymnastics team, were delayed for 16 years and 17 years. The alleged crimes happened when the accusers were teenagers, so a large part of the periods of silence were
spent when the accusers were adults. This means the delay had to do with something
more than just the immaturity of the accusers. In this section, we show that the delay
of the first report can be an equilibrium outcome if we also allow V
 1to report in the
second period before V
 2can and if there is some discounting (i.e., δ < 1).
In Figure 2, we modify the timeline of the basic model by allowing V1 to have a
chance to make a delayed report in period 2 before she learns about the existence of
another report against A. If V1 does not use this chance, she still has another chance
to make a delayed report after V2has her chance to report. The timeline for potential
libelers is modified in a similar manner.
 2’s report, we denote
In this modified setting, if V
 1 reports in period 2 followed by V
 2, we denote
the event by R
 r. If V1reports in period 2 and there is no report by V
the event by Rϕ. We will focus on a corroboration equilibrium in which agent A is
arrested if and only if there are two reports against him (i.e., in the events r r, rR,
or Rr).
By the time of the second period, V1already knows that she is V1. If she has
not yet reported, by reporting in period 2, she will get payoff p − cbecause with
probability p , V2exists and will follow up with a report. By not reporting in period
 1 can
2, V1  will get pa(1 − c) because V2 will report with probability a , after which V
 1, who is indiffollow up with a report. Therefore, the cutoff type (denoted cˆ 2) of V
ferent between reporting and not reporting in period 2 before V
 2’s turn to report, is
determined by p − cˆ 2  = pa(1 − cˆ 2), which gives
p(1 − a)
	cˆ 2(a, p)  =  _  .
1 − pa
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Any V1 whose cost is below cˆ 2(a, p)will report in period 2 if she has not reported
before. For the case where A
is innocent, L
1 whose cost is below cˆ 2(b, q)
= q(1 − b)/(1 − qb)will report in period 2 if she has not reported before.
There are two cases to consider: (i) cˆ 2(a, p) ≥ a, and (ii) cˆ 2(a, p) < a. However,
only case (i) is relevant;22 we therefore focus on case (i). In this case, some types of
victim with c ∈ (a, cˆ 2(a, p)]will choose not to report immediately but rather wait
until period 2 to lead with a delayed report.
Consider a new victim who has not seen a prior report. The expected net payoff
from reporting immediately is:
(1/2) p
1−p
    [−c]  +  ____________
     [ δ − c]
   _____________
1 − (1/2)p cˆ 2(a, p)
1 − (1/2) p cˆ 2(a, p)

(1/2) p(1 − cˆ 2( a, p)) 
+  _______________
  
     1 − c].
1 − (1/2) p cˆ 2( a, p) [

Her expected net payoff from not reporting immediately is:
(1/2) p
1−p
1   δc   +  _____________
	 _____________
    [−  _
  
     δ 1 − c)].
1 − (1/2) p cˆ 2(a, p) 2 ] 1 − (1/2) p cˆ 2(a, p)[ (
The first term above refers to the situation where another victim does not exist.
Given this, there is probability 1/2that the new victim is V1, in which case she will
make a delayed report in period 2 if her cost is c < cˆ 2( a, p).
By the same logic as in the basic model, the equilibrium probability that a new
victim will report immediately, denoted adel, is the solution in ato the following
equation:
1/2
   [−a(2 − δ − pcˆ 2(a, p))  + p(1 − cˆ 2(a, p))]  = 0.
Fd el(a; p)  ≡  _______________
1 − (1 / 2)pcˆ 2( a, p)

It is straightforward to show that a unique adel  ∈ (0, 1)exists, and that adel
increases in pand δ .

PROPOSITION 8: Suppose V1 can make a delayed report in period 2
before V2  has her chance to report. Then, in a corroboration equilibrium, (i) if
 , p)],
c ≤ adel, then V1 reports immediately in period 1; (ii) if c ∈ (adel, cˆ 2(adel
then V1 makes a delayed report in period 2 before V2  has her chance to report; and
 , p), then V1  makes a delayed report in period 2 if and only if she
(iii) if c > cˆ 2(adel
observed that V2 has reported. Compared with the corroboration equilibrium in the
basic model, ad el  < a  ∗  < cˆ 2(adel, p)when δ < 1.

22
In case (i), c > aimplies c > cˆ 2 (a, p). Any type who does not report immediately when she is a new victim will choose to wait in period 2 rather than leading with a delayed report. Then the condition that determines
the equilibrium value of a is the same as in the basic model, i.e., a satisfies F
 (a; p) = 0. But because δ < 1,
F(a; p) = 0implies p (1 − a + a2) > a, which contradicts cˆ 2 (a, p) ≤ a.
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PROOF:
Suppose δ = 1. Then the option for V
 1to make a delayed report before knowing
whether V2 has reported or not has no value to V1because there is no discounting. This
 , p) = a  ∗ for δ = 1. Now, adel
   − cˆ 2(adel
 , p)is increasing in δ
implies adel  = cˆ 2(adel
   − cˆ 2(adel, p) < 0for all δ < 1. Furthermore,
because adel increases in δ. Thus, adel
because cˆ 2(adel, p)decreases in δ  whereas a  ∗increases in δ , we have cˆ 2(adel, p) > a  ∗
for all δ < 1.
For any δ < 1, the condition Fdel(adel; p) = 0can be written as:
	
−a(2 − p cˆ 2(adel, p))  + δad el  + p(1 − cˆ 2(adel, p))  = 0.
The fact that cˆ 2(ad el, p) > ad el implies
	
−a(2 − pad el)   + δad el  + p(1 − adel)  > 0.
Moreover, cˆ 2(a, p) > aif and only if a < p(1 − a + a  2  ). This implies that
	
−a(2 − p ad el)  + p δ(1 − adel  + a  2d 
   + p(1 − adel)  > 0,
el)
which is equivalent to F
 (ad el; p) > 0. As F( ⋅ ; p)is single crossing from above, we
∗
obtain adel  < a  . ∎
This corroboration equilibrium exists if and only if
	max{ℓ(r), ℓ(Rϕ), ℓ(rϕ)}  < min{ℓ(rr), ℓ(Rr), ℓ(rR)}.
For example, when λv  = λl, p = 0.3, q = 0.1, and δ = 0.8, we have a d el  = 0.20,
cˆ 2(adel, p) = 0.26, bd el  = 0.076, and cˆ 2(bdel, q) = 0.09. In this case, max{ℓ(r),
ℓ(Rϕ), ℓ(rϕ)} = ℓ(r) = 2.89 and min{ℓ(rr), ℓ(Rr), ℓ(rR)} = ℓ(Rr) = 30.18.
Therefore, ℓ(r) < ℓ(Rr), and the corroboration equilibrium exists for ℓˆ   ∈ (ℓ(r),
ℓ(Rr)]. Compared with the basic model in which a  ∗  = 0.22 and b  ∗  = 0.08, V1 (or L1)
in the basic model is less likely to report in period 1 but is more likely to have
reported in period 2 before V
 2 (or L2 ) chooses to report.
B. Guilty One Faces Both Victims and Libelers
It is natural that libelers may exist not just for an innocent agent but also for a
guilty one. In this subsection, we assume that both the guilty and the innocent agent
face the same chance of having potential libelers, but the guilty one also faces an
additional chance of accusation by victims. We show that this difference alone can
generate differences in reporting behavior between victims and libelers to produce
semiseparation between guilty and innocent types, so here we remove recidivism
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as a force for semiseparation by assuming independent probabilities of existence of
potential reporters across two periods.
Suppose that, in each period independently, a guilty agent Ahas probability x of
facing a victim, probability yof facing a libeler, and probability 1 − x − yof facing
neither a victim nor a libeler. On the other hand, an innocent agent has probability y
of facing a libeler and probability 1 − yof not facing a libeler (an innocent agent
never faces a victim). We assume that these events are independent across periods.23
Let a denote the probability that a new victim reports immediately and b denote the
probability that a new libeler reports immediately. The common prior that the state
is guilty is μ
 0.
We study a corroboration equilibrium again. For the purpose of comparing with
the basic model, we let p = x + yin this section. Also let aEbe the expected probability of reporting of the other potential accuser (given her existence) from the
perspective of a victim, i.e.,
y
x
_
(11)	aE  =  _
x + y   a +   x + y   b.

Then, a new victim can entertain three possibilities: (i) another accuser does not
exist (with probability 1 − p), (ii) she is V1and another accuser exists (with probability ( 1/2) p), or (iii) she is V2and another accuser existed but did not report (with
probability ( 1/2) p aE). Her payoff from reporting immediately is:

(1/2) p(1 − aE )
(1/2) p
    [δ ]  +  __________
  
    [1].
	
−c +  _________
1 − (1/2) p aE 
1 − (1/2) p aE 

Her payoff from not reporting immediately is:

(1/2) p
    [aE  δ(1 − c)].
	 _________
1 − (1/2) p aE 

This implies that the equilibrium probability of reporting by a new victim must satisfy:
(12)

(1/2) p(1 − aE)
(1/2) p
     δ(1 − aE (1 − a))  +  __________
  
    
fboth(a, aE , p)  ≡ −a +  ________
1 − (1/2) p aE 
1 − (1/2) p aE
= 0.

A new libeler does not know the state. Since both states give rise to the same
probability of a libeler, a new libeler uses prior μ0. Again, for comparison with the
basic model, we let q = μ0   x + yin this section. Also let bEbe the expected probability of reporting of the other accuser (given that she exists) from the perspective
of a libeler, i.e.,
μ0   x
y
_
(13)	bE  =  _
 0   x + y   a +   μ0   x + y   b.
μ

23
We purposefully use independent probabilities here to show that correlation is not needed for this model
extension. The mere fact that x > 0can generate different behavior between the victims and libelers.
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A similar argument shows that the equilibrium probability of reporting by a new
libeler must satisfy:
(14)

(1/2) q(1 − bE )
(1/2) q
   δ( 1 − bE(1 − b))  +  __________
  
    
fb oth(b, bE , q)  = −b +  _________
1 − (1/2) q bE 
1 − (1/2) q bE 
= 0.

 are solutions in aand bto the system of four equaThe equilibrium aboth and bboth
tions: (11), (12), (13), and (14).
PROPOSITION 9: In a corroboration equilibrium in which a guilty agent may
face both victims and libelers, ab oth  > bboth. Moreover, ℓ(rr) > ℓ(rR) in this
equilibrium.
PROOF:
Suppose to the contrary that aboth  ≤ bboth. Note from equations (11) and (13)
 both and bb oth and that aE
that the equilibrium a  ∗E  and b  ∗E are weighted averages of a
puts more weight on a
 both than does bE. This implies aboth  ≤ a  ∗E   ≤ b  ∗E   ≤ bb oth.
The function fboth(a, aE, p)is decreasing in a, decreasing in aE, and increasing in p.
Note also that p = x + y > μ0   x + y = q. Therefore,
	0 = Fb oth(aboth, a  ∗E , p)  > Fb oth(bboth, b  ∗E , q)  = 0.
This forms a contradiction.
bboth
, which in turn implies
We have established that a

both  > 
that aboth  > a  ∗E   > b  ∗E   > bb oth. The likelihood ratios of the events rrand rR are,
respectively:
p  2 a  ∗E 
	
ℓ(rr)  =  _
   ;
y  2 bboth

p  2 a  ∗E(  1 − a  ∗E)  
_______________
  
ℓ(rR)  =    
   .
y  2 bb oth(1 − bboth)

Therefore, a  ∗E   > bb oth and p > yimply ℓ(rr) > ℓ(rR). ∎
Here, a victim and a libeler both expect there to be the same chance of another
potential libeler in another period. But a victim’s private information tells her that
the chance of a true victim being out there is higher than what an uninformed libeler
thinks. Therefore, the encouragement effect is stronger for a victim than for a libeler,
and the main results carry through: a new victim leads with a higher probability
than a new libeler, and a delayed report is met with suspicion in a corroboration
equilibrium.
C. Strategic Agent
In the basic model, the guilty agent is nonstrategic and commits crimes according to exogenous probabilities. We can endogenize the existence of victims
by letting the guilty agent strategically choose whether and when to commit a
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crime to gain some benefit. Likewise, an innocent agent can strategically choose
whether and when to avoid offending at a cost and thus prevent having to face
potential libelers.
We will capture the difference between the criminal and the innocent agent in
the following way: the criminal has a benefit of crime that is persistent over the
two periods—a criminal who gains a high benefit from a crime will still gain a high
benefit in the next period from another crime. This captures another aspect of the
tendency for perpetrators of sexual crimes to engage in repeat offenses. In contrast,
we assume that the cost for an innocent agent to avoid being libeled is independent
across the two periods. We show that this simple difference can drive the same main
result of s emiseparation in the reporters’ behavior.
Consider first the behavior of a criminal agent. In each period, the criminal agent A
 
chooses whether or not to commit a crime. Suppose his benefit from committing
each crime is π, which is distributed uniformly on the interval [0, 1]but is persistent
over the two periods, and his cost of being arrested is 1. For this extension, we will
focus on characterizing the corroboration equilibrium. We continue to denote a new
victim’s expected probability of reporting immediately by a.
If a crime was not committed in period 1, then A
 will surely commit a crime
in period 2 because one report cannot get him arrested. If a crime was committed in period 1 and V
 1 has reported, Ahas no incentive to commit another crime
in period 2, because V
 2upon seeing a previous report will surely report, and two
reports will cause A
 to be arrested.
Now consider the subgame where a crime was committed in period 1 but V1 did
not report in period 1. If A
 decides to commit the crime again in period 2, he gets
payoff π
 − a. This is because V
 2, as a new victim, will report with probability a ,
 arrested. If A
 does not commit
after which V
 1will follow with a report that will get A
the crime, his payoff is 0. Therefore, he commits the crime in period 2 if and only
if π > a.
Going backward to period 1, the payoff from committing a crime in period 1 is
	
π + (1 − a)δ max{π − a, 0}.
Here, 1 − ais the probability that V
 1does not report, which gives him a chance
to commit a crime again in period 2. His payoff from not committing a crime in
period 1 is δ π, reflecting that he can commit a crime in the future with impunity
because a single report from V
 2is not enough to get him arrested. Thus Awill surely
commit a crime in period 1.
Consider the incentive of a new victim. She entertains two possibilities:
(i) She is V
 1. If she reports, there will be no more crime. The cost of reporting is c 
. If she does not report, then with probability 1 − a, the crime will be repeated
and V2 will report with probability a, which she can then follow with a report.
 1 will
(ii) She is V2. A previous victim must exist but was silent. If she reports, V
follow with her report. The payoff is 1 − c. If she does not report, the payoff
is 0.
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Conditional on her own existence and the silence so far, the probability of her being V1 is 1/(1 + (1 − a)  2  ), and the probability of her being V2 is
(1 − a)  2/(1 + (1 − a)  2  ). The payoff difference between reporting immediately and
not doing so is:
 1 − a)  2
(
1
  
  2 [1 − c].
 2 [−c − (1 − a)aδ(1 − c)]  +  ___________
	fg(c, a)  =  ___________
1 + (1 − a)  
1 + (1 − a)  

g(0, a) > 0 > fg(1, a). Therefore,
For any a, fg ( ⋅ ,  a)is strictly decreasing, with f
there exists cˆ g(a) satisfying fg (cˆ g(a), a) = 0such that the best response is to report
immediately if and only if c ≤ cˆ g(a). The equilibrium of reporting by a new victim,
denoted ag , is the solution to:
1
  
(15)	Fg(a)  ≡ fg (a, a)  =  ___________
 [−a + (1 − a)  2(1 − a − aδ)]  = 0.
1 + (1 − a)  2

Next, we consider the behavior of an innocent agent. In each period, there is a
person with the intention to libel (a libeler). For example, a professor can see that a
student is failing his class because of poor performance, or a boss is firing a worker
because of tardiness. When a libeler exists, the innocent agent Acan exercise caution to avoid being libeled. For example, the professor can avoid meeting the student alone in the office, or even bend the rules to let that student pass despite poor
performance. To exercise caution (or to bend the rules), there is a cost γ1 in period 1
and γ2in period 2. We assume that γ1 and γ2are distributed uniformly over [0, 1] and
independently across two periods. We will just call the action “exercising caution”
(which includes bending the rules) for simplicity. Exercising caution removes any
grounds for the libeler to make a complaint against A.
If caution was exercised in period 1, then Awill not exercise caution in period 2.
 will exercise
If caution was not exercised in period 1 and L
 1has reported, then A
caution in period 2. If caution was not exercised in period 1 but L1 has not reported,
then Aexercises caution in period 2 if and only if γ2  < b.
Going back to period 1, if Aexercises caution, he does not have to do so in the
future, so the payoff is −γ1. On the other hand, if Adoes not exercise caution in
 will definitely
period 1, there are two possibilities. (i) If L
 1libels in period 1, A
exercise caution, paying a cost E[γ2 ]. (ii) If L1does not libel in period 1, A will
make a decision in period 2 based on his p eriod 2 cost of exercising caution, paying
a cost E[min{γ2, b}]. Therefore, the expected payoff from not exercising caution in
period 1 is:
δb(3 − b)
   ≡ −q1 (b).
	
−δ(bE[γ2]  + (1 − b)E[ min{γ2, b}])  = −  _
2

In period 1, Awill exercise caution if and only if −
 γ1   > −q1(b). Since γ1  is uniformly distributed on [0, 1], L1  exists with probability q1 (b).
A new potential libeler knows that there are three possibilities when she sees no
prior report:
(i) She is L
 1. This happens with probability ( 1/2) q1 (b). If she reports, there will
be no more potential libeler (thus no more report) in the future. Her payoff
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would be −c. If she does not report, with probability 1 − b (the probability
 2in the future who will report with probability b . Her
that γ2   > b), there is L
payoff would be (1 − b)bδ(1 − c).
(ii) She is L2 and L1 exists but did not report. This happens with probability
 1  < q1(b), γ2  > b, and L1 not to
(1/2) q1 (b)(1 − b)  2, since it requires γ
report. In this case, if L2 reports, L1 will follow and Awill be arrested. The
payoff for L2 would be 1 − c. If she does not report, Awill not be arrested.
The payoff would be 0.
(iii) She is 
L2 and L1 does not exist. This event happens with probability
(1/2)(1 − q1(b)). The payoff to L2 would be −cif she reports, and 0if she
does not.
Let fi(c, b)represent the payoff difference between reporting immediately and not
doing so, which is given by:
q1 (b)
________________
     
  2 [−c − (1 − b)bδ(1 − c)]
1 + q1(b)(1 − b)  
q  b  1 − b   2

1 − q  b 

1( )(
1( )
)
________________
  2 [1 − c]  +  ________________
  
  2 [−c].
	  +    

1 + q1(b)(1 − b)  

1 + q1(b)(1 − b)  

For any b, fi( ⋅ , b)is strictly decreasing, so there exists a critical level of reporting
cost below which a new libeler will make an accusation. The equilibrium probability
of reporting by a new libeler, denoted bi, is the solution to:
1
(16) Fi(b)  ≡ fi(b, b)  =  ________________
  
 [−b + q1(b)(1 − b)  2(1 − b − bδ)] 
1 + q1(b)(1 − b)  2
= 0.

We are now in the position to show that ag  > bi. Note that Fi(b)is single crossing from above in b. Therefore, it is sufficient to show that Fi(ag ) < 0. From equations (15) and (16), we have
1
	Fi(ag)  =  _________________
  
  − 1 − qi(ag)) ag]  < 0.
1 + q1(ag )(1 − ag )  2[ (
This establishes that 
ag  > bi. The intuition is that V2 knows for sure
 1exists. As in the basic
that V1  exists, but L2does not know for sure that L
model, the higher belief that one’s report will be corroborated raises the
encouragement effect to cause a new victim to break the silence with a greater
probability.
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D. Possible Payoff Differences
Different payoff assumptions about victims and libelers would have predicable
implications for the results. To this end, we derive comparative statics results with
respect to the cost and benefit of reporting. This exercise also serves to demonstrate
that the assumption that reporting costs are uniformly distributed is not essential for
our model.
Suppose the distribution of reporting cost is given by G(c; κ)on the support [ 0, 1].
Here, an increase in κrepresents a first-order stochastic increase in reporting cost.
Suppose the benefit of getting the accused arrested is ρ > 0. In a corroboration
equilibrium, if the strategy is for a new victim to lodge a complaint against A if
and only if her reporting cost is lower than some critical value cˆ , then a = E [α(c)]
= G(cˆ ; κ). Whenever it is interior, the critical type cˆ is indifferent between reporting immediately and not doing so. Therefore, the equilibrium value of a for victims
satisfies the indifference condition:
1/2
	f(cˆ , a; p)  =  _________   [ −cˆ (2 − pa)  + pδ(ρ − a(ρ − cˆ ))  + p(ρ − a)]  = 0,
1 − (1/2) pa

where cˆ   = G  −1(a; κ). This payoff difference is s ingle crossing from above in a .
Moreover, a higher κ raises G  −1(a; κ)for any a. Because the payoff difference
decreases in G  −1(a; κ), the equilibrium value a  ∗must fall as κincreases. Not surprisingly, a stochastic increase in reporting cost causes people to be less forthcoming in making an allegation. Similarly, it is straightforward to show that a  ∗ increases
in ρ
 , i.e., a higher benefit from having the accused arrested causes people to be more
forthcoming in making an allegation.
We can apply this comparative statics result to study differences in costs or benefits between victims and libelers. For example, in practice libelers may face the possibility of being discovered as libelers and may suffer negative consequences as a
result. This can be incorporated as a higher cost of reporting than for the true victims.
Assume that the distributions of reporting cost for victims and libelers are G
 (c; κv )
and G
 (c; κl), respectively, with κl  > κv . Our analysis would predict that a  ∗  > b  ∗
even if p = q. In this case, the model would be similar to that in Chandrasekhar,
Golub, and Yang (2018), in which s emiseparation of victims from libelers is driven
by differences in the distribution of reporting costs.
Alternatively, one can imagine that libelers may be partly motivated by private
compensation, so that they can get a benefit even if the accused is not arrested. If we
model the possibility of private compensation as a stochastic reduction in reporting
cost for libelers (but not for victims), then this will suggest that κl  < κv , which has
the effect of raising b  ∗ relative to a  ∗, which in turn has the effect of reducing the
credibility of crime allegations.
E. Other Extensions
Our model can be modified in other directions. We show that the correlation
structure in the basic model can be replaced by the assumption that the existence
of victims (or libelers) in the two periods is independent across time, provided that
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the probability of having a potential accuser in each period is greater for the guilty
type than for the innocent type. Several extensions would not alter the main results
of the paper, such as (i) allowing the reporters to know which period they are in and
(ii) allowing more victims than just two. We describe these extensions more fully in
Appendix B.
V. Callisto Reporting System

An online sexual assault reporting system called Callisto had been adopted by
eight universities by late 2017. This reporting system allows a student to log a
report into the system under the precondition that it will be released to the school
only if another student names the same perpetrator, an option called “match.” The
system also allows reporting to the school authority directly, but the system does
not allow any potential reporter to see other reports in the system. The n onprofit
organization that founded this system believes that sexual assault is prevalent on
campus, that the reporting rate is low, and that repeat offenders are not stopped.24
The Callisto reporting system falls under the definition of an “information escrow”
in Ayres and Unkovic (2012), because Callisto allows people to transmit information to it under seal and have the information forwarded only under prespecified
conditions.25
In this section, we examine the outcome assuming that a school uses Callisto as
the reporting channel. Other assumptions maintained in the basic model are kept the
same. The action choice for the school is to investigate and discipline the accused
or not. We assume that an infinitesimally small cost is incurred when one enters a
report into the system, and cost cis incurred when the report is submitted to the
school authority because only then is the potentially unflattering conduct of the
accuser known, and only then does the emotionally exhausting investigation begin.
The Callisto system can potentially create three distinguishable events at the
school in our two-period setup: (i) no report (denoted ϕ), (ii) two reports and both
are not delayed (r r), and (iii) two reports and one is delayed (r R). Any time only one
report is in the system, the system shows no report to the school. To give reporters
strict incentive to report, either r ror rRshould lead to an investigation and possibly
to disciplinary action. For there to be an interesting issue, no report from the Callisto
system should lead to no action by the school. We focus on the corroboration equilibrium, in which both rrand rRcause the school to take investigative or disciplinary
action. This requires ℓˆ   ≤ ℓ(rr) and ℓˆ   ≤ ℓ(rR).
First, observe that for a victim or a libeler, using the “match” option is better
than reporting directly to the school through the Callisto system. If there is already
another corroborating report, then it makes no difference. If there has not been
one, then using the “match” option can avoid wasting the reporting cost or can
24

See the Callisto website, https://www.projectcallisto.org/what-we-do.
Sometimes, journalists perform a role that is similar to an information escrow. They do not publish a story
until they have gathered a few allegations from different sources. For example, the New York Times broke the story
on Harvey Weinstein in October 2017 after gathering allegations from multiple women. The accusers were not
paying the cost of publicly accusing Weinstein until several pieces of corroboration were available and the news
article was published.
25
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delay the reporting cost if the corroborating report comes in the future. Second,
logging the complaint into the system right away is better than waiting to log it
later, as long as the chance of having a corroborator is not infinitesimally small.
Therefore, in any corroboration equilibrium, a victim or a libeler logs the complaint into Callisto with no delay. This means that the event 
rroccurs with
probability p λvif the accused is guilty, or with probability qλlif the accused is
innocent.
On the equilibrium path, the reports are submitted to the school only when the
event is r r. The likelihood ratio corresponding to this event is ℓ (rr) = p λv/q λl. For
this event to be sufficient for the school to take action, we must have ℓˆ   ≤ pλv/qλl.
As long as there are not two reporters, there is no alert to the school authority: ϕ. The
likelihood ratio corresponding to this event is ℓ (ϕ) = (1 − pλv )/(1 − qλl), which
has to be less than ℓˆ in a corroboration equilibrium. Because rRis off equilibrium,
we can assign an off-equilibrium belief such that ℓˆ   ≤ ℓ(rR). This establishes the
following result.
PROPOSITION 10: Under a Callisto reporting system, a corroboration equilibrium
exists if and only if
–
1 − p λv  _
p λ 
ℓ Cal, ℓ Cal]  ≡ (_
 
  ,    v   .
	ℓˆ   ∈ 
(_
1 − q λl q λl ]

This interval is nonempty as long as p λv   > qλl. Because of the stronger incentive
to report for both victims and libelers, the equilibrium probability of reporting immediately satisfies a
 Cal  = 1 > a  ∗ and bCal  = 1 > b  ∗. However, because aCal  = bC al
∗
whereas a    > b  ∗, two reports (rr) from the Callisto system do not carry the same
level of credibility as two reports (rr) without the Callisto system. In fact, two reports
(rr) in the Callisto system may even carry less credibility than the event rR without
the Callisto system if p is not very large. If p ≤ 2/3, then ℓ(rR)in the basic model is
–
–
–
greater than ℓ Cal. Therefore, if p ≤ 2/3 and ℓˆ   ∈ (ℓ Cal, ℓ   ∗  ], the standard of proof is so
high that victims have no incentive to pay the infinitesimally small cost of lodging a
complaint, knowing that even two reports are not sufficient to cause the school to take
action under the Callisto system. In contrast, the same standard of proof will induce a
positive equilibrium probability of reporting a  ∗without the Callisto system. In other
words, adopting the Callisto system can potentially backfire if maintaining credibility
of allegations is a serious concern.
VI. Conclusion

Allegations about sexual crimes and misconduct can be difficult to handle
because they often leave behind no physical evidence. Victims usually do not have
hard evidence to prove the existence of the crime, which gives libelers ample
opportunities to fake as victims. This article shows that, despite this difficulty,
allegations without hard evidence have a certain level of credibility. First, an allegation proves the existence of an individual who has the intention of either a
victim or a libeler. This fact alone may carry some credibility if the probability of
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existence of such potential allegation makers is larger for a true criminal than for
an innocent person. Second, the tendency of sexual criminals to repeatedly offend
gives a victim more confidence about the existence of another potential corroborator than it gives a libeler. As a result, in a corroboration equilibrium, a victim is
more motivated to encourage other potential corroborators by leading with a first
report against the accused than a libeler is against an innocent person. This difference in equilibrium behavior boosts the credibility of an undelayed report while
reducing the credibility of a f ollow-up report that alleges a crime that occurred a
long time ago.
The decision maker who handles crime allegations in our model is the police
and the prosecution team, who can take into account the entire history of reports to
reach a decision of whether to search, arrest, or prosecute. For cases of less severe
sexual harassment, the decision maker may be the human resources department
of the employer, which may also use Bayesian inference to reach a decision on
whether the accused should be punished or not. It also applies to the decision of
the trial judge or jury whenever “prior bad acts” are admissible under the Federal
Rules of Evidence, whether as an exception to Rule 404, under Rule 406 to establish a habit, or under Rules 413 through 415, all of which are adopted by most
states (Reed 1993).
Absent in our model are the settlement between the accused and the accuser and
the confidentiality clauses typical in settlement agreements. These clearly played a
role in the suppression of some public allegations of crimes and misconduct. Neither
do we consider fully the possible behavioral responses by the agent being accused.
In the main model, we simply assume that the agent’s behavior is n onstrategic.
In Section IVC, we present an extension in which an agent strategically decides
whether to engage in a crime. Nevertheless, he always chooses to commit the first
crime because one allegation is not sufficient to lead to an arrest. More realistically,
there are significant costs to an agent when he is publicly accused, such as loss of
reputation, even if the accusation does not constitute sufficient evidence to cause an
arrest. A public allegation may also cause other potential victims to take more caution against the agent. Our extended model does not fully capture these deterrence
effects arising from crime allegations. Incorporating these more realistic features
into our model is an agenda for further research.
Appendix
A. Omitted Proofs
PROOF OF LEMMA 1:
Take the derivative of f (c, a; p)in equation (3) with respect to a to get
(1/2) p
∂f
	 _  =  _______   [ f ( c, a; p)  − δ(1 − c)  − (1 − c)],
∂a
1 − (1/2) pa
which is negative because f (c, a; p) < 1 − c. ∎
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PROOF OF LEMMA 2:
Take the derivative of equation (3) with respect to pto get

∂f
1  δ − c − aδ 1 − c  
1
  1   af c, a; p)  + c +  _
    _
	 _  =  _______
(
))
2(
∂p
1 − (1/2) pa [ 2 (

1  1 − a  1 − c  
+  _
)(
)]
2(

(1/2) a
	
>  _______   [   f(c, a; p)  + c + δ(1 − a(1 − c))  + (1 − a)(1 − c)],
1 − (1/2) pa
which is positive because f (c, a; p) > −c. ∎

PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5:
. Note also that 
brr satisfies
(i) We have shown in the text that 
arr  < a  ∗
Frr  (brr; q) = 0. Because Frr  (a; p)is single crossing from above in aand increasing
in p, q < p implies brr  < arr.
In an 
rr
-equilibrium, event 
rroccurs with probability 
p λv  arr. The corre. Two events lead to
sponding likelihood ratio is 
ℓ(rr) = p λv  arr/(q λl brr)
the event r. Either the current period is period 1 and V
 1 reports (this happens
V1 either
with probability (1/2) λv  arr), or the current period is period 2 and 
did not exist or did not report while V
 2 reports (this happens with probabilℓ(r)  = λv (2 − p arr) arr/(λl  (2 − q brr) brr).
ity 
(1/2)(1 − p arr)λv  arr). Therefore, 
, we obtain ℓ(r)
Substituting arr= pδ/(2 − p arr) and brr  = qδ/(2 − q brr)
= p λv /q λl. Therefore, an rr-equilibrium exists if
–
p λ  p λv arr
ℓ rr, ℓ rr  ]  ≡ (_
  v  ,   _
   .
	ℓˆ   ∈ 
(_
q λl q λl brr ]

 2 does not exist. The
The event r ϕoccurs when V
 1exists and makes a report but V
corresponding likelihood ratio is ℓ (rϕ) = λv(1 − p) arr/(λl(1 − q) brr) < ℓ_rr. The
events Rand r Rare off equilibrium, and we can assign off-equilibrium beliefs such
that their corresponding likelihood ratios are below the standard of proof.
–
Because arr  > brr, it is obvious that the interval ( ℓ_rr, ℓ rr  ]is n onempty. To estab–
–∗
lish that ℓ rr  > ℓ   , we show

a  ∗(1 − a  ∗)
arr
   .
   >  _
	 _
brr
 
b   ∗(1 − b  ∗)
Because these two sides are equal when 
p = q
, it suffices to show that
  decreases in p, which requires
a  ∗(1 − a  ∗)/arr

∂ arr
∂ a  ∗
1 − 2 a  ∗    _
1 _
_
	 _
∗
∗ ∂ p   <   arr    ∂ p   .
a  (1 − a  )
If a  ∗  ≥ 1/2, then the condition above is satisfied. So, assume a  ∗  < 1/2. In this
case, the condition above is equivalent to
1 − 2 a  ∗
1
_____________________________
   <  _
   
   ,
	   
2 − 2p arr
 
(1 − a  ∗)(2 + (1 + δ)p(1 − 2 a  ∗))
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which holds for all a  ∗  < 1/2.
Finally, we establish that p ≤ 2/3 implies ℓ_rr  > ℓ_  ∗. Because the latter is equivalent to
 2 − p  a  ∗

p
(
)
  ,
	 _∗   <  _
q
 2 − q  b  
(

)

it is sufficient to establish that ( 2 − p) a  /pdecreases in p , i.e.,
∗

∂ a  ∗  = −2a  ∗  +  2 − p   ____________________
2a  ∗
   < 0.
  
  
	
−2a  ∗  + (2 − p)p  _
(
)
∂p
2 + (1 + δ)p(1 − 2a  ∗)

This inequality holds because p ≤ 2/3 implies a  ∗  < 1/2.
(ii) We have shown in the text that arR  < a  ∗. As in part (i) of the proof, q < p
implies brR  < arR.
In an 
rR
-equilibrium, the likelihood ratio corresponding to event 
rR
is ℓ (rR) = p λv  arR(1 − arR)/(q λl brR(1 − brR)), and the likelihood ratio corresponding to event ris ℓ(r) = λv(2 − p) arR/(λl  (2 − q) brR). The event rϕoccurs whenever V1exists and makes a report (because V2 does not report as rrdoes not lead
to arrest). The corresponding likelihood ratio is ℓ(rϕ) = λv  arR/(λl brR) > ℓ(r).
An rR-equilibrium exists if
–
λ  a  pλv arR( 1 − arR) 
ℓ rR, ℓ rR  ]  ≡  _
  v rR  ,   ______________
  
    .
	ℓˆ   ∈ ( _
( λl brR qλl brR( 1 − brR) ]

The events Rand rrare off equilibrium, and we can assign off-equilibrium beliefs
such that their corresponding likelihood ratios are below the standard of proof.
–
nonempty, we need to show that
To show that the interval 
( ℓ_rR, ℓ rR  ]is 
p(1 − arR) > q(1 − brR). It suffices to show that the left-hand side of this inequality is increasing in p, which requires
∂ arR
2 arR
  
  
  = 1 − arR  −  ____________________
   > 0.
	1 − arR  − p  _
∂p
2 + (1 + δ)p(1 − 2 arR)

It is straightforward to verify that FrR(1/2; p) < 0. As FrR( ⋅ ; p)is single crossing
from above, we have a
 rR  < 1/2, which implies that the inequality condition displayed above holds.
Next we show that
a   ∗ 1 − a  ∗ 

a   1 − a  
brR(1 − brR)

rR(
rR)
(
)
___________
   .
	 _
∗
∗    <  

b  (1 − b  )
It is sufficient to show that (a  ∗(1 − a  ∗))/(arR(1 − arR))decreases in p , i.e.,

1 − 2 arR _
∂ a 
∂ a  ∗ ___________
1 − 2 a  ∗    _
	 _
    rR   < 0.
∗
∗ ∂ p   −  
arR(1 − arR
 ) ∂ p
a  (1 − a  )
Plugging in the partial derivatives, this is equivalent to
1 − 2 arR
 
1 − 2 a  ∗
_____________________________
   −  ______________________________
	   
   
  
   
   < 0,
∗
∗
 )(2 + (1 + δ)p(1 − 2 arR))
(1 − a  )(2 + (1 + δ)p(1 − 2 a  )) (1 − arR
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which reduces to
	(1 + δ)p(1 − 2 a  ∗)(1 − 2 arR)(a  ∗  − arR)  < 2(a  ⁎  − arR).
–

–

 , the inequality above is true. This establishes that ℓ   ∗ < ℓ rR.
Because a  ∗  > arR
Finally, we show that p ≤ 2/3 implies
 2 − p  a  ∗
 2 − b) b  
(

arR
(
)
	 _∗   <  _
   .
brR

It suffices to show that (2 − p) a  ∗/arR decreases in p, which is equivalent to

4(2 − p)(1 + δ)(a  ∗  − arR)
   < 0.
	
−1 +  ____________________________________________
    
     
(2 + (1 + δ)p(1 − 2 a  ∗))(2 + (1 + δ)p(1 − 2 arR))
The left-hand side is increasing in δ. Therefore, it is sufficient to establish that
2(2 − p)(a  ∗  − arR)
	
−1 +  _______________________________
   < 0.
   
   
(1 + p(1 − 2 a  ∗))(1 + p(1 − 2 arR))
From equations (4) and (9), we obtain
	2(a  ∗  − arR)  = pδ − p(1 + δ)(a  ∗(1 − a  ∗)  − arR(1 − arR))  < pδ,
because 
p ≤ 2/3 implies a  ∗  < 1/2. Hence, 2(2 − p)(a  ∗  − arR) < 1, which
establishes that _
ℓ   ∗  < ℓ_rR. ∎
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 7:
(a) Let Edenote the set of events such that ℓ( ) ≥ ℓˆ  (i.e., the set of events that
lead to an arrest). In an r -equilibrium, r ∈ Eand R
 ∉ E. If r ∈ E, then it does not
matter whether any of r ϕ, rr, and r Ris in E
 . The events r ϕand r rwill not appear
because the game ends right after r. The event rRis off equilibrium because within
a period after r, no one has incentive to make a delayed report.
In an r-equilibrium, reporting immediately gives a new victim 1 − c. Not reporting gives her (1/2) paδ/(1 − (1/2) pa)  (when the victim is V
 1 and V2 exists and
reports with probability a). The equilibrium probability of reporting right away,
denoted ar, is defined by the solution to the following equation:
(1/2) pa
	Fr(a; p)  ≡ 1 − a −  _______  δ = 0.
1 − (1/2) pa
A new libeler reports right away with probability b
 r, which satisfies Fr  (br; q) = 0.
As Fr  (a; p)is s ingle crossing from above in aand is decreasing in p, ar is decreasing
in p. From this we obtain ar  < br.
The event roccurs either when V1 reports immediately (which happens with
probability ( 1/2)λv  ar) or when V2 reports immediately if V1  does not report (which
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happens with probability (1/2)(1 − p ar)λv  ar). The corresponding likelihood ratio is
ℓ(r) = λv (2 − p ar) ar/(λl(2 − q br) br). Thus, an r-equilibrium exists if and only if
λv ( 2 − p ar) ar
–
	ℓˆ   ≤ ℓ r  ≡  ____________
  
     .
λl( 2 − q br) br

The event Ris off equilibrium, and we can assign off-equilibrium beliefs such that
–
ℓ(R) < 
ℓˆ . Note that ℓ r  < λv /λlif and only if (2 − p ar) ar/((2 − q br) br) < 1.
This condition is true because p > qand (2 − p ar) aris decreasing in p .
(b) We next consider an R
 -equilibrium, in which R
 ∈ Ebut r ∉ E. If r ∉ E,
then rϕis not in E. Otherwise, after r, no one (victim or libeler) will report. So the
belief after rϕshould be the same as the belief after r, which forms a contradiction.
It follows that there are only four possible types of R
 -equilibrium:
(i)	
r ∉ E, R ∈ E, rr ∈ E, rR ∈ E;

(ii)	
r ∉ E, R ∈ E, rr ∉ E, rR ∈ E;

(iii)	
r ∉ E, R ∈ E, rr ∈ E, rR ∉ E;
(iv)	
r ∉ E, R ∈ E, rr ∉ E, rR ∉ E.

Consider case (i). For a new victim, reporting immediately gives a payoff of

(1/2) p(1 − a)
(1/2) pa
	 _______  δ +  _________
  
  
 − c.
1 − (1/2) pa
1 − (1/2) pa
Not reporting gives payoff of

(1/2) p(1 − a) _________
(1/2)(1 − pa)
(1/2) pa
  
  
   δ 1 − c),
	 _______  δ(1 − c)  +  _________
 +    
1 − (1/2) pa
1 − (1/2) pa
1 − (1/2) pa (
 2  does not exist. Thus,
because any V1 can delay reporting to achieve an arrest even if V
not reporting immediately dominates reporting immediately even when c = 0.
It follows that the equilibrium probabilities of reporting immediately by new victims
and new libelers are aR  = bR  = 0. Only event Roccurs in equilibrium; r rand r R
are off-equilibrium events. The likelihood ratio associated with event R is λv/λl.
Thus, an R-equilibrium exists if and only if
–
λ 
	ℓˆ   ≤ ℓ R  ≡  _v   .
λl

In case (ii), the payoff from reporting immediately is smaller than that in case (i)
(because the first term of that payoff becomes 0when rrdoes not lead to arrest),
but the payoff from not reporting immediately remains the same as that in case
(i). It follows that not reporting immediately still dominates reporting immediately.
The equilibrium probabilities of reporting immediately are aR  = bR   = 0, and this
equilibrium exists if and only if ℓˆ   ≤ λv /λl.
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In case (iii), the payoff difference between reporting immediately and not reporting immediately for a new victim is
(1/2)p(1 − a) _________
(1/2)(1 − pa)
(1/2)pa
fR (c, a; p)  ≡  _______
 
  
  
  
 δ − c −    _________
 +    
 
δ 1 − c) .
)
( 1 − (1/2)pa
) ( 1 − (1/2)pa
1 − (1/2)pa (
Thus, fR (a, a; p) = 0if and only if
	
paδ − a(2 − pa)  − p(1 − a)  − (1 − pa)δ( 1 − a)  = 0.
The left-hand side of the equation above is convex in aand is negative at a = 0
and at a = 1. Therefore, fR (a, a; p) < 0for all a ∈ [0, 1]. The only equilibrium
probabilities of reporting consistent with this case are a
 R  = bR  = 0, and this equilibrium exists if and only if ℓˆ   ≤ λv /λl.
In case (iv), the payoff from reporting immediately is smaller than that in case
(iii), but the payoff from not reporting immediately remains the same as that in case
(iii). It follows that not reporting immediately still dominates reporting immediately. The equilibrium probabilities of reporting immediately are aR  = bR  = 0,
and this equilibrium exists if and only if ℓˆ   ≤ λv/λl. ∎
B. Other Model Extensions
Replacing Correlation with Independence.—The correlation between the existence for the victims across two periods fits the story of recidivism for the sexual
crime offenders. The key of the analysis is that a victim expects another victim to
exist with a higher probability than a libeler expects of another libeler. Therefore,
the difference in the behaviors of victims and libelers can also be generated by
assuming independence across the two periods, if we let the guilty agent hurt a victim each period with a higher probability than an innocent agent offends a potential
libeler. That is, one can alternatively assume that a victim exists with independent
probability p ∈ (0, 1)in each period for a true criminal, and a libeler exists with
independent probability q ∈ (0, 1)in each period for an innocent agent. Then the
assumption p > qplays the same role as in the basic model and generates a   ∗  > b  ∗.
All qualitative results in the basic model will remain the same.
Accusers Know Which Period They Are In.—In the main setup, a victim is not sure
whether she is the early one who gets hurt or the later one who gets hurt. Alternatively,
we can let victims know the timing (although such an assumption is less realistic in
our view). For t = 1, 2, let Vtdenote the victim hurt by Ain period t, who knows that
she is hurt in period t. Just as in the main setup, the crucial strategic variables are the
probability of leading with an undelayed report. Here, since new victims V1 and V2 are
distinctive individuals with knowledge of the calendar time, we denote their probabil 1 for a new
ity of reporting immediately by a
 1 and a2, respectively. Similarly, we have b
first-period libeler and b2for a new second-period libeler.
One can show that, just as in the main setup, the net benefits of reporting immediately for a new V1and for a new V2are both decreasing in the probabilities of leading
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(a1 and a2) by the other victim and increasing in the probability ( p) of the existence
of the other victim. That is, we have the same strategic substitution and encouragement effect. It is straightforward to show that the equilibrium values of a1 and a2
cannot both decrease in p . Indeed, when p is not too large, both a
 1 and a2 increase
in p. In this case, we have a
 t  > bt for t = 1, 2in a corroboration equilibrium of
this alternative model.
More Victims.—Increasing the number of victims or libelers affects the incentive
to make a crime allegation through both the encouragement effect and the strategic
substitution effect. We illustrate this point by showing that having more potential
victims does not necessarily reduce the probability that a new victim will lodge
an immediate report, because the encouragement effect may sometimes outweigh
the freeriding effect to cause these victims to be more forthcoming in making an
allegation.
Consider the following simple modification of the basic model. In period 1, guilty
agent A
 hurts one victim with probability p . In period 2, he hurts two victims with
probability p . Similarly, an innocent agent A
 offends one person with probability q 
in period 1, and another two persons with probability q in period 2. We study a
corroboration equilibrium in which at least two accusations against A
  (rror rR) are
needed before the authorities will arrest him.
The key difference from the basic model is that a victim who learns that there is
a prior report against Adoes not necessarily report against him (i.e., αˆ 2(c) ≠ 1)
because she may count on the other victim in period 2 to file a report. One can show
that αˆ 2(c) = 1if and only if c ≤ 1/2.
Given such a strategy by V2, there are two opposing effects on the incentive of a
new victim to report immediately. First, if a victim is V1, she is worried that the two
victims in period 2 may not corroborate her allegation because these two victims
freeride on each other (the probability that at least one of these two victims will
corroborate V1’s report is only 3/4), which reduces her incentive to report immediately. On the other hand, if a victim is V
 2, lodging a complaint immediately may
lead to an arrest if it is corroborated by a contemporary victim, even if V1 does not
exist. This second effect raises the payoff from reporting immediately. Which of
these two effects dominates will depend on parameter values. It is not the case that
having more potential victims always causes each new victim to be less forthcoming
in lodging a complaint.
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